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Case No. 20090084-CA 
IN THE 
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
S. Steven Maese, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his convictions for one count of pattern of unlawful activity, a 
second degree felony, and four counts of exploiting prostitution, third degree felonies. This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2009).1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1(a) Did Defendant affirmatively waive any claim that the trial court's failure to rule 
on his request for a bill of particulars before trial prejudiced him, where he represented on 
the morning of trial that he was prepared to proceed? 
1 (b) Was Defendant entitled to or prejudiced by the lack of a bill of particulars where 
the information and probable cause statement detailed the elements of the offense and their 
factual bases? 
1
 Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the code are to the 2004 West publication. 
Standard of Review. The invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of this 
claim. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54, 70 P.3d 111. 
2. Should this Court entertain Defendant's plain error challenge to the unanimity jury 
instructions, where he invited any error by telling the trial court that his only objections to 
the jury instructions related to another issue? 
Standard of Review. The invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of this 
claim. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54. 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to support Defendant's convictions for pattern of 
unlawful activity and exploiting prostitution? 
Standard of Review. A jury conviction will be reversed for insufficient evidence only 
when, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" as to the defendant's guilt." State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). 
4. Should this Court entertain Defendant's claim of a variance between the 
information and the jury instructions where Defendant did not object below and where he 
told the trial court that his only objection to the instructions was related to another issue? 
Standard of Review. The invited error doctrine also precludes appellate review of this 
claim. See Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54. 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Copies of the following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are in 
Addendum A: 
Utah Const, art. I, § 10; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-1; Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1301,1302,1304,1305; Utah Code Ann. §§76-10-1602,1603; Utah R. 
Crim. P. 4; Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e); Utah R. Evid. 606(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant and Tiffany Curtis were charged by amended information with one count 
of pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1603; four counts of exploiting prostitution, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1305; and one count of money laundering, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903. R8-13. 
The accompanying probable cause statement alleged that Defendant and Ms. Curtis, 
as co-owners of an escort agency—the Doll House—engaged in and received proceeds from 
aiding and encouraging prostitution. Rl 1. According to the probable cause statement, a 
search of the Doll House's place of business yielded documents showing that the agency was 
an unlicensed, sexually-oriented business. Id. The probable cause statement also alleged 
that the Doll House's website contained a link to "theeroticreview.com," where patrons 
could post reviews of escorts. Id. The police "discovered hundreds of reviews" on that site, 
"describing] specific sexual acts that Doll House escorts have performed." Id. 
3 
The probable cause statement further alleged that police had interviewed several 
current and past Doll House escorts, who described "an ongoing pattern by which 
[Defendant] and Curtis aided and encouraged prostitution, and received the proceeds from 
the appointments." Id. The probable cause statement then summarized the statements of 
seven of the interviewed escorts. Rl 1-13. Six of the summaries placed the defendants' 
alleged activities within a range of two to five months. Id. One escort described the 
defendants' pattern of activity over the course of a year. R13. 
After a preliminary hearing at which an investigating officer and three of the escorts 
testified, Defendant and Ms. Curtis were bound over as charged. R40-41; see generally R81; 
R81:138. 
About five months before trial, Ms. Curtis negotiated a plea agreement in which she 
pled guilty to two class A misdemeanor counts of attempted exploitation of prostitution. 
R319:74-75. The plea agreement did not require Ms. Curtis to cooperate with the 
prosecution or testify against Defendant. R319:75. Ms. Curtis later agreed to talk to police, 
and she testified against Defendant at trial. R319:75-77. 
Before trial, Defendant requested and received extensive discovery, including the 
recordings of police interviews with Ms. Curtis and the escort witnesses. R191-92,452-53, 
720. 
A jury acquitted Defendant of the money laundering charge, but convicted him on all 
other counts. R313-14. The trial court denied Defendant's subsequent motion to arrest 
4 
judgment. R696-733. The court suspended the applicable statutory prison terms in favor of 
60 days in jail and 36 months'probation. R808-10. Defendant timely appealed. R821. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant and Tiffany Curtis co-owned and operated an escort agency that required 
their escorts to get naked on every date. Defendant encouraged the escorts to perform sex 
acts for money, and he posted reviews on the Internet detailing the sex acts his escorts had" 
previously perfonned. The following details are presented in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. See State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, \ 2, 994 P.2d 1237. 
The Doll House 
Defendant, a former bank employee, was unemployed when he met and started dating 
Tiffany Curtis. R319:69-70;R320:258. Ms. Curtis was interested in buying the escort 
agency that she worked for and asked Defendant to review the agency's profits and losses. 
R319:70,107;R320:259-61. After Defendant determined they could start their own escort 
agency for much less, the two formed the Doll House. R319:69-70,110; R320:262. 
Defendant brought his business and marketing expertise to the partnership, while Ms. Curtis 
brought her knowledge of the escort industry. R319:70,109,111-12; R320:262-63. 
Defendant and Ms. Curtis consulted an attorney on how to run a legal escort business. 
R319:72; R320:263-66. The attorney gave them a packet and advised them what sexual 
activity was and was not legal. R319:72,266. Ms. Curtis told Defendant that she had made 
good money as an escort without performing any illegal sex acts. R319:109; R320:266-67. 
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But they did not "really talk about" how to run the Doll House without any illegal activity. 
R319:108. 
The two obtained a sexually oriented business license from Park City, because Ms. 
Curtis knew from her escort experience that Park City had more lenient nudity laws. 
R319:3,70,79,110-ll;R320:263-65. They leased an office in Park City, but did no actual 
business there. Rather, they ran the Doll House from Ms. Curtis's home in Cottonwood 
Heights. R 319:7-25,79; R320:264-65. 
Marketing Differentiation 
The Doll House's biggest competitor charged $150.00 just for an escort to show up. 
R3 20:274. The client would have to pay more if he wanted the escort to take off her clothes 
or provide other services. R320:270. For "marketing differentiation," the Doll House 
charged a $145.00 set fee for the escort to show up and "get naked." R320:270-71. 
Of that fee, $95.00 went to the agency and $50.00 to the escort. R319:88, 105,135, 
148, 182, 221; R320:275. But the escort could then earn "tips" by providing additional 
services, such as body massages, lap dances, shower shows, dirty talk, or sex acts, including 
masturbation, oral sex, and full intercourse. R319:104-06, 148-49; R320:182-83,267. 
The escort negotiated the amount of tips she received, based on "[w]hat the gentleman 
wanted to do," R320:149,160, and how much she wanted for each act. R320:149,241. The 
tips belonged to the escort, although Ms. Curtis and Defendant strongly encouraged the 
escorts to share 10 to 20 per cent of their tips with the "phone girl," who set up the 
6 
appointment. R 320:222;State's Ex. 29 at 5. The phone girl was almost always Ms. Curtis. 
R319:89,111-12,136; R320:222,182. The larger the tip an escort gave to Ms. Curtis, the 
more appointments she received. R319:149-50;R320:182; State's Ex. 29 at 5. 
Interviewing and hiring 
Defendant and Ms. Curtis normally interviewed and hired escorts together. R319:72, 
79-80,269-70. They had a "canned script" and told "every single girl that you're required 
to get naked on every single appointment." R320:270; R319:126; R320:146, 159, 181; 
State's Ex. 29 at 4. At first, Defendant and Ms. Curtis told potential escorts what sexual 
activity they legally "could and couldn't do" on an appointment. R319:72, 80. But after six 
to eight months, they "just stopped talking about" the "legalities" during hiring interviews. 
R319:73. They "didn't want to freak anybody out," by making potential escorts "think that 
these guys were going to be aggressive with them." R319:73. They also wanted new escorts 
"to be open to possibilities within the appointment itself," meaning that they did not want 
new escorts to think "the company" would "come down on them" if they were "to have sex 
on an appointment." R319:73-74. 
Not all the Doll House escorts "prostituted themselves." R319:86. But the Doll 
House benefited from those who did. R319:86. Defendant and Ms. Curtis frequently used 
the terms "play ball" or "bailers" to describe girls who would have sex with a client. 
R319:87. New hires were often sent to regular clients on their first appointments to "find out 
if they were up to prostitution or not." R319:86. One escort—Heather W.—was told that 
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she had been sent on some appomtments because Doll House management knew that she 
would have sex with a client "for the right amount." R320:220. 
Policy and Procedures 
Defendant, with the help of Ms. Curtis, wrote a policy and procedures manual, which 
they gave to each escort upon being hired. R319:81-82; R320:298; State's Ex. 29. The 
manual set forth the fee structure, dress code, and appointment requirements. State's Ex. 29. 
Escorts were required to "dress in a skirt/dress and heels on all jobs," arrive on time, have "a 
positive and friendly attitude," and become "fully nude" where allowed by law. State's Ex. 
29, at 3-4. They were also required to "[ejntertain the client for a fullfifty (50) minutes" and 
could be fined if they left an appointment early "without permission." Id. at 4, 6 The 
manual neither required nor prohibited sex acts. State's Ex. 29; R319:81-82. 
Doll House proceeds 
The escorts always collected the $145 appointment fee upfront. R320:148,169,175, 
241, 274; State's Ex. 29 at 5-6. As soon as the appointment ended, they returned to Ms. 
Curtis's residence where they turned in the $95.00 agency fee and any tips for the phone girl. 
R319:95, 124; R320:212; State's Ex. 29 at 6. Defendant was almost always there, counting 
money. R 319:95, 124. On one occasion, Defendant was "really excited" because he had 
collected $5,000 so far that day. R319:124. One escort noticed that the $95.00 agency fee 
and tips for the phone girl were placed in the same bag as the agency fees. R320:226-27. 
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Defendant used money collected by the escorts to pay for phones, advertising, 
utilities, and photography equipment. R319:19-36, 112, 136; R320:269, 279-80, 305-07; 
State's Exs. 20,21,22, 23,27. Doll House financial records showed money transfers from 
the Doll House to Defendant's personal bank account. R319:27-33. 
Advertising 
Defendant, as the managing partner, was in charge of advertising. R320:307. He 
explained that the success of the Doll House was "all about the advertising, it's all about 
what you can communicate to the public." R320:269. Defendant and Ms. Curtis 
"plaster[ed] their phone number everywhere," and advertised in many different publications 
and on the Internet. R320:273; R319:21. 
Defendant also set up a website for the Doll House on which he posted photographs 
that he had taken of the escorts. R319:14-15, 95, 122, 164, 307. He photographed the 
escorts wearing "sexy clothing, lingerie, underwear." R319:122. One escort described the 
poses, as "very, you know, sex poses." R319:122. 
The Erotic Review 
Defendant placed a link in the upper right-hand corner of the Doll House website to 
The Erotic Review. R319:16, 83;R320:308-10. The Erotic Review is a nationwide website 
where people post reviews of various erotic services, such as escorts, massages, strip clubs, 
or gentlemen's clubs. R319:16, 82-83. 
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According to Ms. Curtis, The Erotic Review "will make or break an [escort] agency in 
Utah." R319:83. It is "the primary source . . . to get your name out there, the Doll House 
and any particular girl who worked there." R319:83. 
Defendant and Ms. Curtis regularly checked The Erotic Review to see what was being 
said about their escorts. R319:83-85; R320:125-27, 308-11. Some of the reviews said that 
Doll House escorts had engaged in unlawful sexual activity. R320:310-12. Poor reviews 
were "bad" for business and affected the Doll House's income. R319:85. Defendant and 
Ms. Curtis printed out some of the reviews to show the escorts at company meetings. 
R319:1145125-26. They talked about "what was good and what was bad." R319:114,125-
26. A bad review included a "girl talking on her cell phone with her boyfriend, a girl 
refusing to be nice , . . . refusing to get naked . . . refusing to have sex . . . . " R319:114-15. 
Defendant and Ms. Curtis wrote some reviews themselves and posted them on The 
Erotic Review. R319:116-17. All the reviews said that the escort would engage in sexual 
activity. R319:116-17. "[T]here was no other point in writing [them]," Ms. Curtis 
explained. R319:117. 
Doll House escorts engaged in sex acts for money 
Six escorts testified at trial that they regularly engaged in sex acts—i.e., masturbation, 
oral sex, or sexual intercourse—for money on appointments set up by the Doll House. 
R319:125;R320:125,150,167,183,211,240. Escorts were generally expected to work 40 
to 50 hours per week. R319:129; R320:150-51; State's Ex. 29 at 4. Some escorts had as 
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many as three to four appointments a day, or fifteen to twenty in a week. R319:123; 
R320:151. One escort testified that she engaged in sex acts in about one-third of her 
appointments, R320:167; two testified that they engaged in sex acts on about half their 
appointments, R319:125; R320:150; one testified that she engaged in sex acts between 60 
and 70 per cent of the time, R320:183; and one testified that she engaged in sex acts on all of 
her appointments, R320:240. 
Defendant encouraged Doll House escorts to engage in 
sex acts for money and discouraged them from quitting the business 
Defendant knew that Doll House escorts were engaging in sex acts for money, 
because he discussed with them what they did on appointments and how much they were 
paid. R319:87-88, 103; R320:186-88, 235-36 . He encouraged them to engage in sex acts 
for less money and, when they wanted to quit the business, he discouraged them from doing 
so. RR319:126-27, 128-32; R320:160, 186, 234-46, 237-38. Witnesses testified to the 
following specific examples. 
The bachelor party. In early 2005, Defendant went to a bachelor party with two Doll 
House escorts. R319:97. Defendant called Ms. Curtis from the party to say that "they were 
in and [had] collected" the fee. Id. After the party, Defendant returned the two escorts to 
Ms. Curtis's home, where he showed Ms. Curtis photos he had taken of the bachelor's 
"below average penis size" and of the two escorts performing oral sex on each other with 
jam or jelly. Id. 
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Not just a lap dance. Defendant once drove an escort to a hotel for an appointment, 
because he could get her there much faster than if she drove herself. R320:233-34. 
Defendant told her that she was going to see "a regular," and that "this is not just a lap dance 
or dancing or anything." Id. The escort understood this to mean that the appointment would 
involve "[sjexual stuff." Id. As the escort got out of the car, Defendant told her that this 
client usually gave around a $400.00 tip. Id. 
Inside, the client handed the escort $400 and "expected [her] to do everything, like 
sexual intercourse and everything." The escort "had a problem with that" because she 
normally charged $800 for intercourse and $400 for just "a hand job." The escort ultimately 
"stripp[ed] down," "rub[ed] [her] butt on his dick," and gave him oral sex. R320:235. 
When Defendant picked the escort up, he asked what she did for the $400. Id. When 
she told him that she "basically jacked him off and gave him a blow job," Defendant told her 
that she "need[ed] to be a little more liberal than that" for $400. R320:235-36. 
Calling escorts. While Ms. Curtis answered the phone, she sometimes had Defendant 
call the escorts to send them to their appointments. R320:326-37. Defendant berated one 
escort for being late to two appointments in one night. R320:237. When that escort declined 
an appointment a few weeks later, Defendant called her and wanted to know why. 
R320:238. The escort said she thought she was fired; Defendant replied, "You would know 
if you were fired." R320:238. The escort then took the appointment, but testified that she 
would not have if Defendant had not called her back. R320:239. 
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Charging too much. One escort complained to Defendant that other escorts were 
charging too little to have sex with clients, which made clients reluctant to pay her asking 
price of $300 to $1,000. R319:103; R320:187-88. Defendant told her that she was not worth 
$300. R319:103;R320:187-88. 
Make the guy happy. Defendant encouraged the escorts in company meetings to 
"work harder," "get good reviews," and "make people happy"; the escorts understood this to 
mean that they should provide sex acts for less money than other escort agencies. R319:126-
27; R320:160. Defendant told one escort, during a dispute with a "regular" client over the 
fee for sexual intercourse, to go to a gas station, buy condoms, and go back and "make the 
guy happy." R320:186. 
A letter to an escort's parents. When a top earning escort wanted to quit, Defendant 
left her about five voicemail and text messages, in which he first offered to help her work 
things out, but then threatened that he would "be forced to take some measures" against her 
if she did not call him back. R319:128-32. Defendant warned that she "wouldn't be happy 
about what was going to go on." R319:128-32. The escort never called Defendant back. 
R319:132. . 
About six months later, Defendant drafted and sent an anonymous letter to the 
escort's parents calling her a "whore" and detailing the kinds of sexual activities she had 
engaged in both while a Doll House escort and afterwards. R319:99-100, 132-34; State's 
Ex. 30. Defendant enclosed photos of the escort from her My Space page, another escort 
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agency's website, and the Doll House website. Defendant also enclosed the escort's reviews 
from The Erotic Review. R319:100, 132-34; State's Ex. 30. 
The Defense 
Defendant testified that he and Ms. Curtis always told the escorts that they could not 
legally engage in sexual activity on an appointment. R320:281-82. He denied that either he 
or the Doll House received any proceeds from the tips that the escorts paid Ms. Curtis. 
R320:277-78, 293. He also denied receiving money that he understood to have come from 
escorts performing sex acts on other people. R320:293. According to Defendant, the only 
money he received was strictly from "escorting activity," i.e., "they showed up, they got 
naked and they spent an hour with the customer." 320:293. 
Defendant denied encouraging any Doll House employee to commit sex acts. 
R320:293-94. He also denied knowingly driving any escort to a location where a sex act was 
committed, although he admitted to occasionally driving them to appointments. R320:294. 
On direct examination, Defendant claimed that he had never learned of nor had any 
knowledge that sex acts were committed by any Doll House employees. R320:294. On 
cross-examination, however, he admitted that he had read erotic reviews on his escorts 
stating that they had committed sex acts. R320:310-11. He claimed that such conduct would 
initially result in a "verbal rebuke," and that he fired "probably two or three" escorts for 
engaging in illegal sexual activity. R320:312. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to 
compel a bill of particulars before trial. The invited error doctrine forecloses appellate 
review of this issue, where defense counsel affirmatively represented to the trial court that he 
was ready to proceed to trial, even though he had not yet received a bill of particulars. In any 
event, Defendant has not shown that he was entitled to a bill of particulars where the 
information and two-page probable cause statement detailed the elements and factual bases 
of the charged offenses. Defendant also has not made a credible showing that his defense 
would have been different if he had received a bill of particulars. 
Point II: Defendant argues that the jury instructions failed to ensure that the jury 
turned a unanimous verdict. Defendant acknowledges that he did not raise this challenge 
below; he therefore asks this Court to review the unanimity instructions for plain error. 
But the invited error doctrine also precludes appellate review of this claim. It is well-
settled in Utah that a party may not obtain even plain error review of alleged instruction error 
when that party affimiatively told the trial court that he had no objections to the challenged 
instructions. Here, defense counsel raised only one, unrelated challenge to the jury 
instructions. He then told the trial court that he had nothing further. And when the jury later 
sent a question to the trial court about the instructions, defense counsel argued that the 
instructions were "adequate," and that the jury should simply be told to re-read the 
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instructions. Those representations amounted to invited error. But even if Defendant were 
entitled to plain error review, he has not shown obvious, prejudicial error. 
Point III: Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
convictions. This Court should decline to reach his challenge because he has not marshaled 
the evidence. In any event, as the trial found, a "mountain of evidence" supported the 
convictions for four counts of exploiting prostitution and one count of pattern of unlawful 
activity. 
Point IV: Defendant argues that the elements instruction for pattern of unlawful 
activity created a fatal variance with the information, because it permitted the jury to find 
him guilty on a statutory alternative that was not charged in the information. Again, the 
invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of this claim. As explained, Defendant 
affirmatively stated that he had no objections to the instructions, other than on one unrelated 
matter. In any event, Defendant has shown no prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED ANY CLAIM THAT HE 
WAS PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO RULE 
ON HIS REQUEST FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS BEFORE 
TRIAL; IN ANY EVENT, DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO, 
OR PREJUDICED BY THE LACK OF, A BILL OF A PARTICULARS 
Background 
About 45 days before trial, defense counsel moved for a bill of particulars 
"specifically identifying the factual information the State intends to rely upon in the 
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prosecution of Counts II, III, IV, and V," the exploitation of prostitution counts. R167, 332. 
The motion did not ask for any other information, nor did it seek a bill of particulars on the 
unlawful pattern of illegal activity or money laundering charges. R167. The State filed a 
timely opposing memorandum, arguing that Defendant had already received specific factual 
information regarding the place, date, and time of the offenses, "as known by the 
prosecution," through the information, probable cause statement, preliminary hearing, and 
extensive pretrial discovery. Rl 69-71. In his reply, filed one week before trial, Defendant 
contended that he lacked notice because it was impossible to reconcile the evidence with the 
individual charges. Rl 86-87. 
Three days before trial, the trial court held argument on the request for the bill of 
particulars and Defendant's motion to disqualify the entire prosecutor's office. See R717. 
The court promised to issue a written decision on the pending motions before trial began.2 
R332,717. The court issued a written decision the same day denying Defendant's motion to 
disqualify the prosecutor's office, but not mentioning the motion for a bill of particulars. 
R203-09. 
On the morning of trial, defense counsel did not ask the trial court for a ruling on his 
motion for a bill of particulars, nor did he otherwise direct the court's attention to the fact 
Defendant did not have that hearing transcribed, and the minute entry for the hearing 
does not note that argument was had on this or any other motion. Rl97-98. However, both 
Defendant's motion to arrest judgment and the trial court's ruling denying that motion agree 
that the trial court held oral argument on the motions and promised to rule on the motions 
before trial. R332-33; R716-18. See also Br. Aplt. 8-9, 25-30. 
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that it had not yet issued a ruling on that request. R717-19. Instead, when asked whether he 
was ready to proceed, Defendant said that he was.3 R717-18. 
After the jury returned a guilty verdict, defense counsel moved to arrest judgment, 
pointing out for the first time that the trial court had not ruled on his motion for a bill of 
particulars. R332. He asserted that he "depended on this ruling in order to adequately 
prepare [a] defense." R334. He claimed that if the trial court had denied the motion, he was 
"prepared to seek an interlocutory appeal," and that if the motion had been granted, he 
"would have designed a defense in relation to the specific act or acts alleged." R334. 
Counsel argued that it was too late for the trial court to go back and rule on the motion for 
the bill, and that Defendant was therefore automatically entitled to a new trial. R334-35. He 
alternatively argued that the lack of a bill of a particulars denied Defendant adequate notice 
to prepare a defense. R336-42. 
The trial court found that Defendant waived any right to a ruling when, instead of 
asking for the ruling, he told the trial court he was ready to try the case. R718. The trial 
court also concluded that Defendant was not harmed where the information and probable 
cause statement had given him sufficient notice of the charges against him. R721-26. (A 
copy of the court's ruling is in Addendum B). 
3
 This exchange does not appear in the partial transcripts included in the record on 
appeal. See R83 8:3; R319:1. The trial court, however, relates this exchange in its denial of 
Defendant's motion for arrest of judgment. R718. Defendant also agrees that "the trial 
court asked both litigants if they were ready to proceed with trial" and that "[b]oth parties 
answered affirmatively." Br. Aplt. 28. 
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On appeal, Defendant again faults the trial court for not ruling on his request for a bill 
of particulars before trial. Br. Aplt. 25-29. He takes issue with the trial court's finding that 
he waived any right he may have had to a ruling. Br. Aplt. 28-29. He contends that he was 
prejudiced by the lack of a bill of particulars because the information and probable cause 
statement did not give him sufficient factual detail to adequately prepare a defense. Br. Aplt. 
19-25. 
Defendant invited any error with respect to the trial court's failure to rule on the bill 
of particulars motion. He thus affirmatively waived any claim that he lacked notice or was 
prejudiced by the lack of a bill. In any event, as found by the trial court, Defendant was 
neither entitled to a bill nor prejudiced by its absence, because the information and probable 
cause statement sufficiently detailed the charges. 
A. Defendant invited any error and therefore affirmatively waived any claim 
that he was entitled to, or prejudiced by the lack of, a bill of particulars. 
This Court should not address Defendant's claim that he was prejudiced by the trial 
court's failure to rule on or compel a bill of particulars because he invited any error. 
1. Invited error or affirmative waiver precludes appellate review. 
To obtain appellate review, a party ordinarily must first raise the issue in the trial 
court. Pratt v.Nelson, 2007 UT 41, [^ 15, 164P.3d366. To preserve an issue for appeal, the 
objection must be timely, specific, and supported by evidence or relevant legal authority. Id. 
This rule is "based on the premise that, 'in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court 
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ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.'" 
Id. (quoting State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 33, 122 P.3d 543). While an appellate court may 
review an unpreserved claim for plain error or manifest injustice, it will do so only if the 
appellant argues that plain error or exceptional circumstances justifies review. Id. at ^ 16. 
But the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that an affirmative waiver—or 
invited error—precludes even plain error review. See Pratt, 2007 UT 41, \ 16; State v. 
Winfield, 2006 UT 4, Tf 14, 128 P.3d 1171); State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d 
111; State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ 9, 86 P.3d 742. A party has committed invited 
error when counsel, "either by statement or act affirmatively represented to the [trial] court 
that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings]." Pratt, 2007 UT 41, f 16 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
The affirmative waiver or invited error doctrine "arises from the principle that a party 
cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error." Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ f 15. It recognizes that parties are "not entitled 
to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting at trial," and it 
discourages parties "from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden 
ground for reversal on appeal." Pratt, 2007 UT 41, f 17 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). It is "designed to . . . inhibit a defendant from foregoing... an objection 
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with the strategy of enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy 
fails,.. . claiming on appeal that the court should reverse."4 King, 2006 UT 3, ^  13. 
2. Defendant affirmatively waived or invited any error when he told the 
trial court that he was ready to proceed to trial. 
Although Defendant initially raised his bill of particulars claim in the trial court by 
moving for a bill, that did not preserve the issue for appellate review. Defendant 
subsequently led the trial court into the error he now advances on appeal by affirmatively 
stating on the morning of trial that he was ready to proceed, even though the trial court had 
not yet ruled on his motion for a bill of particulars. R718. 
Defendant claimed in his motion to arrest judgment that he "depended on" the trial 
court's ruling "to adequately prepare his defense." R334. He asserted, for the first time, that 
if the trial court had denied the motion, he was "prepared to seek an interlocutory appeal," 
A trial court may sometimes cure a defendant's failure to timely raise claims of error 
at trial by reaching the merits of those claims in a post-judgment motion, such as a motion to 
arrest judgment. See State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992) (per curiam) ("trial 
court in effect reopened the trial when it held an evidentiary hearing" after a bench trial); 
State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991) (same with jury trial). The principle 
underlying those cases is that the trial court "'chose not to treat the defendant's failure to 
raise the issue . . . as a waiver.'" Belgard, 830 P.2d at 265-66 (quoting Matsamas, 808 P.2d 
at 1053). Those cases do not apply to this issue, because the trial court here treated this 
claim as waived. See R718. Those cases, which involved only simple waiver, also do not 
apply to the type of invited error presented in this case. It would gut the invited error 
doctrine to permit a defendant to purposefully sow error and to cure that error simply by 
raising the issue in a post-trial motion. See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (invited 
error doctrine precludes defendant from inviting prejudicial error and then implanting it in 
the record "as a form of appellate insurance"). But see State v. Beeson, 2000 UT App 109, Tf 
12-15, 2 P.3d 459 (applying Belgard to cure invited error by appellant, but not addressing 
whether Belgard should apply in such cases). 
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and that if the trial court had granted the motion, he "would have designed a defense in 
relation to the specific act or acts alleged." R334. 
The time to point out that he needed the bill of particulars to adequately prepare a 
defense, however, was before trial began, not after the jury had rendered a guilty verdict. 
Defendant knew before trial whether he needed a bill to adequately prepare a defense. Yet, 
instead of reminding the trial court of his pending motion, Defendant told the court that he 
was ready for trial. That statement affirmatively represented to the court that Defendant, in 
fact, did have sufficient notice to adequately prepare a defense and that a bill of particulars 
was unnecessary. It also deprived the trial court of an opportunity to avoid any error or 
prejudice to Defendant. See Cruz, 2005 UT 45, % 33 (trial court ought to be given first 
opportunity to address, and if necessary, correct a claimed error). Only after the jury 
returned its guilty verdict did Defendant shift strategies, claiming that a bill of particulars 
was so critical to his defense that he was prepared to seek interlocutory review, if necessary. 
Thus, the record here suggests that Defendant purposefully forwent an objection to 
implant an error in the record "as a form of appellate insurance." Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1285. 
After allowing trial to proceed without a ruling on the bill of particulars, Defendant argued in 
his motion to arrest judgment that the trial court's failure to rule on the motion alone entitled 
him to a new trial. See R332-35. Defendant repeats that argument on appeal, asserting that 
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it is too late for the trial court to go back and rule on the issue and that he is entitled to 
automatic reversal and a new trial.5 See Br. Aplt. 25-28. 
Defendant's invited error is comparable to that in State v. Lowder, 483 P.2d 886, 887 
(Utah 1971). There, Lowder asked for, and the trial court ordered, a bill of particulars. Id. 
at 886. But the prosecution delayed providing the bill until the Friday before the Monday 
trial was to begin. Id. The morning of trial, Lowder's counsel complained that he had "too 
little time to prepare his defense after the Bill was furnished." Counsel thought he was 
entitled to a continuance, but he declined one because his client "was anxious to have the 
matter out of the way." Id. 
On appeal, Lowder argued that the State's failure to timely furnish a bill of particulars 
should have resulted in dismissing the charges. Id. at 887. The Utah Supreme Court 
answered Lowder's claims by finding "an obvious waiver of such right by defendant's 
failure to ask for a continuance." Id. The Court also noted that Lowder "apparently 
considered the statement [provided in the bill of particulars] of little consequence, else he 
would have asked for the continuance which he waived." Id. The Court concluded that 
Lowder could not "invite error by such procedure." Id. 
5
 The State does not agree that a trial court is precluded from going back and 
explaining its reasons for the denial of a motion, even when that denial is the practical result 
of the trial court's failing to rule before trial. As the trial court noted below, State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991), on which Defendant's argument depends, involved 
an entirely different circumstance and is inapplicable here. R722-23. Defendant's argument 
on this point, however, places in stark relief the policy considerations underlying the invited 
error doctrine. 
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This case, like Lowder, presents the precise scenario that the invited error doctrine is 
designed to prevent—a defendant seeking "both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the 
benefit of objecting at trial." King, 2006 UT 3, }^ 13. Had the bill of particulars in fact been 
critical to his defense, Defendant would have alerted the trial court to its failure to rule on his 
motion before trial and sought a continuance. He should not be permitted to benefit from 
misleading the trial court into thinking that he had adequate notice and was prepared to go to 
trial without the bill of particulars.6 
6
 Defendant challenges the trial court's waiver finding as a misinterpretation of rule 
12(f), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that a defendant's failure to timely 
raise defenses, objections, or pretrial requests constitutes a "waiver thereof." Br. Aplt. 28-
29. Whether or not Defendant waived his rights to a ruling under rule 12(f) is irrelevant 
given that he invited any error by stating that he was ready for trial. 
Defendant also contends that his affirmative response to "a general and customary 
'readiness' question" should not amount to waiver. Br. Aplt. 29. He cites no support for that 
assertion. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has held that an affirmative response to a similar 
"general and customary" question—"do you pass the jury for cause"—amounts to an 
affirmative waiver of claimed errors injury selection. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 1, 17-18. 
Finally, Defendant asserts that he has "no affirmative obligation to, and moreover 
cannot, compel the trial court to rule." Br. Aplt. 29. While a party may not be able to 
"compel" a trial court to rule, nothing in this record suggests that the trial court needed 
compelling. Rather, it appears that the trial court's failure to rule on the motion was merely 
an oversight. If, as Defendant now contends, he truly was not ready to proceed without a bill 
of particulars, it behooved him to inform the trial court of that fact instead of waiting until it 
was too late to correct any alleged harm. Criminal trials are not "sporting events." Medel v. 
State, 2008 UT 32, ^ f 54,184 P.3d 1226. Thus, the defense, like the prosecution, bears some 
responsibility in ensuring that the criminal process is fair. See State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 
506-07 (Utah 1997) ("all parties, including the defense have a duty not to sow error," and "to 
help ensure a, fair trial"). 
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B. Defendant was not entitled to a bill of particulars where he was sufficiently 
apprised of the particulars of the charges to adequately prepare a defense. 
Even if Defendant had not invited error, he suffered no harm from the lack of a ruling 
on his motion, because he was sufficiently apprised of the particulars of the exploitation of 
prostitution counts to adequately prepare a defense. 
1. An accused is entitled to a bill of particulars only when he is not 
sufficiently apprised of the particulars of the charge to adequately 
prepare a defense. 
Article I, section 12, of the Utah Constitution grants an accused "the right . . . to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, [and] to have a copy thereof." 
The right to adequate notice under this provision "requires the prosecution to state the charge 
with sufficient specificity to protect the defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same 
crime and to give notice sufficient for the one charged to prepare a defense." State v. Wilcox, 
808P.2d 1028,1032(Utah 1991). Defendant does not claim that any lack of specificity here 
will subject him to multiple prosecutions for the same crime. He argues only that lack of 
factual specificity prevented him from adequately preparing a defense. See Br. Aplt. 17-31. 
If an information or indictment does not provide the notice guaranteed by article I, 
section 12, the accused may ask for a bill of particulars under rule 4(e) or Utah Code Ann. § 
77-14-1. Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1031. But an accused is "entitled to a bill of particulars 'only 
when the information or indictment is constitutionally deficient by reason of its failure to 
inform of the nature and cause of the offense charged.'" State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App 
238, Tj 15, 166 P.3d 626 (quoting State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 298 (Utah 1992)). 
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The constitutional notice requirement is "designed to give those charged sufficient 
notice to prepare a defense." State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7,f 27,106P.3d734. "Beyond 
requiring a statement of the elements of the offense, however, the test for notice has few 
rules." State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 4 0 4 9,116 P-3d 360. For example, it does not require the 
"exact date when an alleged offense occurred." Id. Moreover, the "particularity 
requirement" is limited to "the 'best information' the prosecution has . . . that may be useful 
in helping to fix a date, time or place of the alleged offense.'" Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ^ f 27 
(quoting State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985)). See also Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 
1032 n.l. 
But the particularity requirement is "'not a device to enable defendants to obtain a 
preview of the prosecution's evidence.'" Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, f^ 27 (quoting Robbins, 
709 P.2d at 773). It neither requires "the prosecution to disclose all the evidence which may 
be introduced at trial," nor "to disclose the exact theory upon which it intends to proceed." 
State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 298 (Utah 1992). Rather, the particularity requirement is 
"merely designed to give those charged sufficient notice to prepare a defense." Id. 
And, "so long as the elements of the crimes are covered by the factual allegations and 
the defendant is fully apprised of the state's information regarding the time, place, and date 
of the crimes, any lack of factual specificity goes not to the constitutional adequacy of the 
notice, but to the credibility of the State's case." Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1033 (citing State v. 
Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208,1213 n.6 (Utah 1987). Thus, "[a]s long as a defendant is sufficiently 
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apprised of the State's evidence upon which the charge is based so that the defendant can 
prepare to meet that case, the constitutional requirement is fulfilled." Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 
1032 n.l. See also State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 105 (Utah 1988) (the "ultimate test" of 
adequacy of notice is whether accused is able to prepare a defense). 
2. Defendant was sufficiently apprised of the particulars of the charges 
against him to adequately prepare his defense. 
As a threshold matter, Defendant's request for a bill of particulars below, and his 
arguments on appeal, challenge the adequacy of notice only as to the four exploitation of 
prostitution counts. R167; Br. Aplt. 17-31. Thus, the question here is whether Defendant 
was "sufficiently apprised of the particulars of [those] chargefs] to be able to 'adequately 
prepare his defense.'" Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1031 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). He was. 
First, the information and probable cause statement together fully informed Defendant 
of the "nature and cause of the offense[s] charged," Bernards, 2007 UT App 238, f 15, and 
gave him "sufficient information regarding the time, place, and date of the crimes" to 
adequately prepare a defense. Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1033. 
Counts II through V alleged that between July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, 
Defendant and Tiffany Curtis, "as parties to the offense," committed exploitation of 
prostitution, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1). R9-10. Each count then set 
forth the following alternative elements of exploiting prostitution as found in the statute: 
Defendant and Curtis (1) "owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone 
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or in association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business"; or (2) 
"procured an inmate for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a 
house of prostitution"; or (3) "encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to 
become or remain a prostitute"; or (4) "transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a 
person into or within this state with a purpose to promote that person's engaging in 
prostitution"; or (5) "not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute, shared the proceeds 
of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding that she was to share therein." 
R9-10. (A copy of the amended information and probable cause statement is in Addendum 
B). 
The probable cause statement exceeded two pages. It set forth the following facts in 
support of the elements of exploiting prostitution: 
• Defendant and Curtis were the registered co-owners of the Doll House, an escort 
agency and sexually oriented business, licensed in Park City, but run from a 
Cottonwood Heights address in Salt Lake County. Rl 1. 
• The Doll House website had a link to "theeroticreview.com" ("TER"), "a website 
that gives reviews of escorts, written by patrons." The investigating officer 
"discovered hundreds of reviews on TER which describe specific sexual acts Doll 
House escorts have performed." Rl 1. 
The probable cause statement then summarized the statements of seven escorts, each 
identified by initials, in a "non-exhaustive description of [Defendant's] and Curtis' 
activities": 
• N.F. reported that between July and September 2005, Defendant identified 
"regular" customers and their likes, "such as oral sex." N.F. reported that Defendant 
once ordered her to an appointment where the customer wanted sex. When the 
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customer called to complain that she would not have sex, Defendant told N.F., 
"B*tch, you're gonna have to make it work." N.F. said that she was not given many 
appointments because she would not have sex with clients and that when she tried to 
leave the Doll House, Defendant "threatened" her. Rl 1. 
• A.F. reported that she worked as a Doll House escort between October and 
December 2005 and that Defendant threatened her if she did not continue working 
there. According to A.F., Curtis regularly encouraged good reviews on TER and 
specifically encouraged "bbbj," a term "for oral sex without a condom." R12. 
• H.T. reported that as a Doll House escort from January to March 2006, she had 
sex with clients for money, and that she always paid Curtis at the Cottonwood address 
following appointments. She reported that for the first four appointments, the entire 
$145.00 agency fee went to the Doll House, plus 20% of any tips. 
• H.R. stated that as a Doll House escort between September 2005 and February 
2006, she had intercourse with clients for money, in addition to manual or oral sex. 
She said that Defendant and Curtis told her that if she was ever arrested for 
prostitution, to keep quiet, and they would get her a lawyer. R12. 
• J.H., a Doll House escort between November and December 2005, stated that she 
had sex with men for money and that she paid money out to Curtis and Defendant at 
the Cottonwood address each time. J.H. also paid Curtis 20% of J.H.'s tips. On one 
date, J.H. received $1,000 for having sex. She paid $100 to the Doll House as an 
agency fee and gave Curtis a $200 tip. Defendant told J.H. that they would pay for a 
lawyer if she would not talk to police. R12. 
• D.T., a Doll House escort between April and May 2006, had as many as three to 
four dates a day and had sex for money. On one date, D.T. refused to have sexual 
intercourse with one customer without a condom. The customer called Defendant to 
complain and Defendant told D.T. "to drive down the hill and get condoms and go 
back and 'work something out.'" R12. 
• T.N., a Doll House escort for about a year between 2005 and 2006, reported that 
the escorts "frequently told" both Curtis and Defendant of the specific sex acts they 
performed. She also said the escorts were required to give 20% of their tips to the 
call girl who set the appointment, usually Curtis. Curtis frequently sent T.N. on 
appointments when a customer wanted a specific sex act that the other escorts were 
not willing to perform. R12. 
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The information and detailed factual allegations in the probable cause statement gave 
more than sufficient notice to Defendant of "the nature and cause" of the four exploitation of 
prostitution charges against him. 
First, the probable cause statement told Defendant that he was charged with 
exploitation of prostitution because he, along with Curtis, "owned, controlled, managed, 
supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution or 
a prostitution business." R9-10. See a/so Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1306(l)(e). Supporting 
facts included that Defendant was a registered co-owner of the Doll House, he knew that 
Doll House escorts regularly engaged in sex acts for money, and the Doll House advertised 
that its escorts engaged in sex acts for money, by providing a link to TER on its website. 
Second, the probable cause statement put Defendant on notice that he was charged 
with exploitation of prostitution because he "procured an inmate for a house of prostitution," 
or "encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to remain a prostitute," by 
personally encouraging at least two escorts—N.F. and D.T.—to engage in sex acts for 
money. R l l (Defendant told N.F. "B*tch, you're gonna have to make work") and R12 
(Defendant told D.T. "to drive down the hill and get condoms and go back and 'work 
something out5"). See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(l)(a), (b). 
Third, the probable cause statement put Defendant on notice that he was charged with 
exploitation of prostitution because he "encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused 
another to remain a prostitute," by threatening two escorts if they quit working for the Doll 
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House. Rl l (Defendant threatened N.F. when she tried to leave the Doll House); R12 
(Defendant threatened A.F. if she did not continue working for the Doll House). 
Fourth, the probable cause statement put Defendant on notice that he was charged 
with exploitation of prostitution because he "shared the proceeds of prostitution with a 
prostitute pursuant to an understanding that she was to share therein." Supporting facts 
included that for the first four appointments, H.T. paid the entire $145.00 agency fee to the 
Doll House, which Defendant co-owned, R12, and other escorts stated that they were 
required to tip Defendant's business owner 20% of their tips. R12-13. 
The foregoing allegations put Defendant on specific notice of facts supporting at least 
six counts of exploitation of prostitution, even though he was charged with only four counts. 
And the probable cause statement explained that these allegations were a "non-exhaustive" 
description of Defendant's on-going acts as reported to police. Rl 1-12. 
The probable cause statement also fully apprised Defendant of the State's information 
"regarding the time, place, and date of the crimes." Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1033. Six of the 
escorts reported Defendant's acts within a two to five month window, based on when they 
worked for the Doll House. Rl 1 -12. The seventh escort placed the reported conduct during 
the course of the year she worked for the Doll House. R13. 
Defendant asserts that other than two factual episodes, the probable cause statement 
did not put him on notice that he had committed any crime. Br. Aplt. 21-23. Defendant 
acknowledges that one of those factual episodes could "reasonably be read" as alleging that 
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he had "encouraged a non-prostitute to change her status to prostitute/5 but asserts that the 
other alleges only the lesser offense of aiding prostitution, rather than exploiting prostitution. 
Br. Aplt. 21-22. But, as shown above, the probable cause statement did articulate facts 
alleging that Defendant engaged in more than four counts of exploiting prostitution by co-
owning a prostitution business and by engaging in an on-going pattern of conduct in which 
he not only encouraged prostitution, but also shared in its proceeds. 
Defendant also argues that the information and probable cause statement did not give 
adequate notice, because they did not "provide a nexus . . . between the counts in the 
information and the paragraphs in the probable cause statement." Br. Aplt. 24. Defendant, 
however, cites no authority that the prosecution is required to tie every factual allegation in 
its probable cause statement to a specific count in the information. Id. Here, the State 
provided detailed factual allegations supporting six or more counts of exploiting prosecution; 
yet it charged only four counts. This is not unlike child sex abuse prosecutions in which a 
child alleges numerous incidences of abuse, but the State chooses to charge a much smaller 
number of counts. See, e.g., State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, ffi[ 1,6, 8 P.3d 1025 (Reed convicted 
of three counts of sexual abuse, but evidence showed "some twenty to thirty incidents"). In 
such cases, nothing prevents the State from adducing evidence proving more counts than 
those charged. Notice requires only that the Defendant be sufficiently apprised of the factual 
allegations to be able to prepare a defense. See Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1032. 
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As explained, the information and the probable cause statement put Defendant on 
notice that he was charged with exploiting prostitution by virtue of his co-ownership of the 
Doll House and his continuing pattern of on-going conduct in that capacity of encouraging 
prostitution and sharing in its proceeds. That was the tenor of all the evidence presented at 
trial. And while it is true that the probable cause statement said that its description of 
Defendant's conduct was "non-exhaustive," Defendant received notice of all the evidence in 
the prosecution's possession from the preliminary hearing, as well as from the recorded 
statements of all the interviewed escorts and his partner Tiffany Curtis. R724-25. See State 
v. Bernards, 2007 UT App 238, % 17 (adequate notice given in child sex abuse case where 
probable cause statement gave detailed facts on each charged offense and where defendant 
provided with recordings of interviews with victim). 
In sum, Defendant was sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of the charged 
offenses to adequately prepare for trial. 
Defendant also asserts that he did not receive sufficient notice of the charges, because the 
exploiting prostitution statute "defines five separate crimes, not merely one crime which may 
be committed in several different ways." Br. Aplt. 19-20. He contends that he was entitled 
"to be charged with a specific crime," and that because the information cited only generally 
to the statute, he did not receive adequate notice of the charges against him. Br. Aplt. 20-21. 
This claim is both unpreserved and inadequately briefed. Defendant never argued below, 
either in his request for a bill of particulars, or in his motion for an arrest of judgment that the 
information provided insufficient notice merely because it cited generally to the statute and 
did not elect between the various ways of coming exploiting prostitution. See R167,186-87, 
323-345. That is reason alone to decline to consider this claim. See Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 
14 (appellate review unavailable for unpreserved claims where appellant does not argue any 
exceptions to preservation rule). Defendant also has not given this Court any authority or 
reasoned analysis to support this argument. That, too, is reason alone to decline to reach it. 
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C. Defendant has not shown the lack of a bill of particulars prejudiced him. 
Even if Defendant was entitled to a bill of particulars, he is not entitled to a new trial 
unless he suffered prejudice. State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988). He did not. 
A defendant suffers prejudice for the lack of a bill of particulars when, "absent the 
error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a result more favorable to the accused." Id. at 
106. The first question in determining whether an alleged notice error harmed the defense is 
"how the error impeded the accused's ability to prepare for trial and to meet the State's 
case." Id. 
Ordinarily, a defendant is assigned the burden of persuading the Court that "in light of 
all the circumstances revealed through the record as a whole, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the trial result would have been more favorable absent the error." Id. However, when 
the alleged error is the lack of adequate notice because of a wrongly denied bill of 
particulars, "if the accused could make a credible argument that the [alleged] errors impaired 
the defense," the burden of persuasion shifts to the State. Id. (citing State v. Knight, 734 
P.2d 913, 920-21 (Utah 1987)). 
Here, the burden of persuasion remains with Defendant because he has made no 
"credible argument" that the lack of a bill of particulars "impaired his defense." Id. "In 
assessing whether the defendant's argument of prejudicial impairment [rings] sufficiently 
See State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, ffif 11-13, 974 P.2d 269 (declining to reach inadequately 
briefed claim). 
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true to warrant shifting the burden of persuasion to the State," the Court must "take into 
account the centrality of the matter affected by the prosecutor's errors." Id. at 106. The 
reason Defendant gave below for asking for a bill of particulars was because it was 
"impossible to reconcile the evidence provided with individual charges." Rl 86-87. This is 
consistent with his argument on appeal that he was entitled to have the prosecution "provide 
a nexus . . . between the counts in the information and the paragraphs in the probable cause 
statement." Br. Aplt. 24. 
Such a nexus, however, was not central to the defense at trial. The defense at trial 
was that, although Doll House escorts might have committed sex acts for money, neither 
Defendant nor the Doll House ever required them to do so, and neither shared in the 
proceeds from acts of prostitution. R838:16-21; R320:355-70. Indeed, the defense 
contended that Defendant took great pains to inform escorts about what they could and could 
not legally do. R320:366. The defense stressed in opening that the way the agency fee was 
split between the Doll House and the escort was "an important part of this case." R838:19-
20. The defense emphasized that the agency fee that went to Defendant as a co-owner of the 
Doll House was strictly for legal conduct—going on a date and getting naked—and that any 
money paid to an escort for illegal sexual activity went solely to the escort and personal tips 
to Curtis. R838:19-20; see also R320:362-63, 367-68. Defendant also testified that he had 
no knowledge that the escorts were engaging in illegal sexual activity, that he never 
encouraged them to do so, and that he never knowingly transported them to an appointment 
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where illegal sexual activity occurred. R320:271-73, 281-82, 293-94. To the extent that 
Curtis's and the escorts' testimony contradicted the latter's, the defense challenged their 
credibility through cross-examination and informing the jury of any motive to lie, including 
their immunity agreements with the State, and any other benefits they may have gained from 
their testimony. R319:112-13;R320:154-55, 161, 195-96,203,215-18,242,248,363-66. 
On appeal, Defendant does not even allege how his defense would have changed if a 
bill of particulars had created "a nexus" between individual counts and specific evidence. He 
merely vaguely asserts that the information and probable cause statement did not give him 
adequate notice to prepare a defense. 
In fact, the defense presented at trial was crafted to meet every conceivable legal and 
factual theory the State presented. And it is clear from the trial court record that defense 
counsel was fully apprised before trial of every piece of evidence presented by the State. 
Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined each of the State's witnesses to advance his 
theories. See, e.g.,R319:104-113,117-18,134-36,138; R320:158-61,172-75,195-203,214-23, 
227,240-49. In addition to having Defendant testify, counsel also called a lawyer to testify 
that, at Defendant's request, he had given training to Defendant's escorts on what was and 
was not legal. R320:319-27. 
In short, Defendant has not made a credible argument that the lack of a bill of 
particulars "impeded [his] ability to prepare for trial and to meet the State's case." Bell, 770 
P.2d at 106. Accordingly, he has not shown prejudice. 
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II. 
DEFENDANT MAY NOT OBTAIN APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE 
JURY UNANIMITY INSTRUCTIONS, BECAUSE HE INVITED ANY 
ERROR BY AFFIRMATIVELY REPRESENTING THAT HIS ONLY 
OBJECTION TO THE INSTRUCTIONS WAS TO ANOTHER ISSUE 
Background 
Defendant next challenges the jury unanimity instructions. Br.Aplt 31-44. The jury 
was instructed generally that its "verdict must be unanimous; all jurors must agree. When 
you are all in agreement, then you have reached a verdict and your work is finished." R284. 
Instruction 40, the exploiting-prostitution elements instruction, told that jury that 
before it could convict Defendant of any of the four counts, it must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Defendant, during the alleged time frame, "did commit an act or acts, which 
standing alone for any such count, constitute the elements of the offense of Exploiting 
Prostitution." R297. The instruction then set forth the five alternative statutory theories 
alleged in the information. Id. At Defendant's request, the elements instruction added that it 
could find Defendant guilty of only one count of exploiting prostitution under the theory that 
he owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept a prostitution business. R298. 
The instruction then added that if, "after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this 
case," the jury was "convinced of the truth of each and every one of the elements of 
Exploiting Prostitution, beyond a reasonable doubt," it must find the Defendant "guilty of 
Exploiting prostitution for any such count." Id. (emphasis added). But if the jury was not 
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"convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of Exploiting Prostitution for any 
count," it must find the Defendant "not guilty of any such count." Id. (emphasis added). 
Instruction 37, the pattern-of-unlawfiil-activity elements instruction, similarly 
informed the jury that it could convict of that count only if it found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that, during the alleged timeframe, Defendant "did commit an unlawful act or acts as 
defined." R294. The instruction then set forth four alternative means of committing an 
unlawful act under the pattern of unlawful activity statute. Id. Like the exploiting-
prostitution instruction, this instruction also told the jury that it could convict only if it was 
first "convinced of the truth of each and every one of the elements of Engaging in a Pattern 
of Unlawful Activity, beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (emphasis added). But if the jury was 
"not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of Engaging in a Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity," then it must acquit Defendant. Id. (emphasis added). 
During deliberations, the jury sent the following question to the court regarding the 
two elements instructions: 
In instruction #37, a, b, c, d, do all of them have to be fulfilled in order 
to find the defendant guilty or just one of the conditions met? Also the same 
question for instruction #40. 
R312. The prosecution proposed telling the jury that any one condition could be met. R864. 
But defense counsel argued that the jury should simply be told that they had "adequate 
instructions and they should reread the jury instructions to find an answer." R864. The trial 
court sent the following response: 
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Both instructions 37 and 40's subparagraphs (the a, b, c's) you refer to 
end with the word "or" and therefore should be read accordingly. 
R312. 
Defendant argues that the general jury unanimity instruction was insufficient to insure 
a unanimous verdict, where the pattem-of-unlawful-activity and exploitation-of-prostitution 
elements instructions permitted the jury to convict him under any one of several statutory 
elements. R294, 297. Defendant contends that the trial court should have sua sponte 
remedied this problem either by compelling the State to elect under which alternative 
theories it wanted to proceed, or by specifically instructing the jury that it had to be 
unanimous as to which alternative legal theory it was basing its verdict. Br. Aplt. 34-38. 
Defendant also challenges the trial court's refusal under rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, 
to consider statements from three jurors to defense investigators implying that the jury may 
not have been unanimous as to the underlying alternative theories of the exploiting 
prostitution counts. Br. Aplt. 38-43. 
Defendant acknowledges that he "failed to request a specific jury unanimity 
instruction." Br. Aplt. 36. He therefore asks this Court to review the jury unanimity 
instructions for plain error. Id. at 36-37. 
Defendant, however, is not entitled to even plain error review of this claim, because 
he invited any error by affirmatively representing to the court that the only objection he had 
to the jury instructions related to another issue. But even if plain error review were 
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available, Defendant has not shown obvious prejudicial error. And, because Defendant is not 
entitled to appellate review of this issue in the first instance, this Court need not decide 
whether the juror statements or testimony were admissible under rule 606(b). But if this 
Court does reach the issue, the trial court correctly refused to consider the statements. 
A. Defendant invited any error, thereby foreclosing appellate review of his 
jury unanimity claim. 
As explained in Point LA, invited error precludes even plain error review. See Pratt, 
2007UT41,^j 15. This rule has been vigorously applied to the jury instruction context. See 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, fflf 54-55; Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ffif 9-13; State v. Anderson, 929 
P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987). 
Rule 19(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that objections to written 
instructions "be made before the instructions are given to the jury." And "[u]nless a party 
objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be 
assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). The term 
"manifest injustice," in this context, is "synonymous with the 'plain error' standard." State 
v. Alinas, 2007 UT 83, % 10, 171 P.3d 1046. 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained, however, that to obtain appellate review 
under the manifest injustice or plain error exception, "counsel must have failed \o object to 
the instruction"—that is "'merely remained silent at trial.'" Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f^ 54 
(quoting Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023). But if counsel, "either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, 
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[the appellate court] will not review the instruction under the manifest injustice exception." 
Id. Utah appellate courts "adhere to this rule for two important reasons." Id. First, it 
promotes the "long-established policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity to 
address the claim of error." Id. Second, "'it discourages parties from intentionally 
misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.'" Id 
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)). 
Utah appellate courts have found invited instructional error (1) when counsel 
proffered an erroneous instruction, see Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ffl[ 8,12; (2) when counsel 
objected to the use of a correct jury instruction and later challenged a substituted erroneous 
jury instruction on appeal, see State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, If 55, 989 P.2d 1091; (3) 
when counsel actively represented that she had read the instruction and had no objection to 
it, see Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023; (4) when counsel failed to object to an instruction when 
specifically queried by the trial court, see State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1108-09; and (5) 
when counsel affirmatively represented to the trial court that he had no objections to the jury 
instructions, see Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f^ 54. 
Here, defendant invited any error by affirmatively representing to the trial court that, 
other than an unrelated issue, he had no objections to the jury instructions as given. After the 
defense rested, the trial court gave both sides a proposed set of written jury instructions, 
which the court had prepared after reviewing the instructions proposed by both the State and 
the defense. R320:33-34. After giving the parties time to review the instructions, the trial 
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court asked the State if it had "[a]ny objections to the instructions as provided." R320:334. 
After hearing the State's concerns, the trial court turned to defense counsel. R320:336. 
Defense counsel asked the court to delete some of the alternatives in the exploitation-of-
prostitution elements instructions for lack of evidence, and to expressly limit conviction of 
one of the alternatives to only one count. R320:337-41. Defendant never asked the trial 
court to give the specific unanimity instruction that he now claims was required. Id. 
After granting part of defense counsel's request, the trial court asked, "Anything 
else?" Defense counsel replied, "That's all I have, Judge." R320:341. 
Defendant subsequently re-affirmed that he had no objections to the adequacy of the 
instructions when, after the jury sent its question on the elements instructions, he told the 
trial court that he believed "no additional instruction was necessary," and that the jury should 
be told that they had "adequate instructions," and that they "should reread the jury 
instructions to find an answer." R863-64. 
By affirmatively representing that he had no other objections to the jury instructions, 
defense counsel led the trial court into believing that its proposed unanimity instruction was 
both correct and sufficient. See Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54; Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109; 
Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023. The invited error doctrine, therefore, precludes appellate review. 
B. Even if plain error review were appropriate, Defendant has not shown 
obvious, prejudicial error in the unanimity instructions. 
Even if Defendant were entitled to manifest injustice or plain error review, he cannot 
prevail. To establish "manifest injustice" or "plain error" in the unanimity jury instructions, 
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Defendant must show that (1) an error exists; (2) the error should have been manifest or 
obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ^ f 16, 20 
P.3d 888. Defendant has not shown obvious, prejudicial error. 
"To establish that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, [Defendant] 
must show that the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made." 
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ j 16, 95 P.3d 276. Defendant has not made, and cannot make, 
this showing. 
It is true that, with the exception of the alternative mental states for murder, "jury 
unanimity is necessary as to all other elements in criminal cases." State v. Standiford, 769 
P.2d 254, 258 (Utah 1988) (citing State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 577-80, 585-88 (Utah 
1988) (Stewart, J., concurring and concurring in the result and Durham, J., concurring and 
dissenting)). See also State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, f 17,20 P.3d 888 (unanimity necessary as 
to all elements of an offense); State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, \ 60, 992 P.3d 951 (Utah 
1999) (plurality) ("Jury unanimity means unanimity as to a specific crime and as to each 
element of the crime"). Thus, in Saunders, the Utah Supreme Court expressly disapproved 
of the following "non-unanimity" instruction: "[T]here is no requirement that the jurors be 
unanimous about precisely which act occurred or when or where the act or acts occurred. 
The only requirement is that each juror believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at least one 
prohibited act occurred [during the period set forth in the information]." Id. at f^ 65. 
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But no settled governing law has held that the unanimity instructions given in this 
case were deficient. To the contrary, one Utah Supreme Court decision questioned whether 
there was any error, obvious or otherwise, in similar unanimity instructions. See Evans, 
2001 UT 22, ^j 15-17. Evans was charged with attempted aggravated murder. Id. at % 15 
n. 1. The charges alleged two alternative statutory aggravating circumstances, which elevated 
the crime from simple attempted murder to attempted aggravated murder. Id. The Evans 
jury instructions "set forth alternative theories [of the aggravating circumstances] on which 
the jury could convict defendant, but the instructions did not explain that the jury must be 
unanimous as to the theory relied upon for the conviction." Id. at \ 15. But the instructions 
did inform the jury that before it could convict Evans, it must find "beyond a reasonable 
doubt, all of the following elements of that crime." Id. at%\5n.\ (emphasis added). 
Like Defendant here, Evans neither objected to the absence of a specific instruction 
on jury unanimity, nor did he propose such an instruction. Id. at \ 16. The Utah Supreme 
Court noted that the unanimity issue was "arguably unclear," and therefore not obvious, at 
the time of Evans's trial. Id. at \ 17. But "[e]ven accepting the notion that failure to instruct 
the jury as to unanimity was an obvious error at the time of [Evans's] trial," the Court was 
"not convinced that the instructions requested by defendant and given by the trial court . . . 
[rose] to the level of the [erroneous] 'non-unanimity' instruction at issue in Saunders" Id. at 
T| 17. The Evans court was also "unconvinced" that any "slight confusion that may have 
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arisen from the wording of the instructions" presented "a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for defendant." Id. at % 17. 
The instructions here were even less "confusing" than those in Evans. The jury here, 
like the jury in Evans, was told that it could find Defendant guilty only if it was "convinced 
of the truth of each and every one of the elements," beyond a reasonable doubt," of pattern of 
unlawful activity and exploiting prostitution. R294; R298 (emphasis added). The jury here 
was also told that its verdict had to be unanimous. R284. That instruction, when read with 
the general unanimity instruction, sufficiently advised the jury that it must be unanimous as 
to each element of the crimes. Certainly, if the Evans's unanimity instructions were not 
obviously erroneous or prejudicial, the instructions here were not. 
C. This Court need not determine whether the juror statements were 
admissible under rule 606(b). 
In support of his motion to arrest judgment, Defendant sought to introduce statements 
by jurors, which he alleges prove that the jury was not unanimous as to which of the 
alternative theories they based their conviction. R351-55; Br. Aplt. 38-43. The trial court 
ruled that rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, precluded consideration of those statements. 
R711-14. Defendant challenges that ruling on appeal. Br. Aplt. 38-43. 
This Court need not reach this issue, because under either the invited or plain error 
doctrines, Defendant is not entitled to appellate review of the correctness of the unanimity 
instructions. The juror statements would be relevant only to whether any error in the 
instructions in fact prejudiced Defendant by causing the verdict to be non-unanimous. But if 
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this Court nevertheless addresses the issue, the trial court correctly ruled that rule 606(b), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, precluded consideration of the statements. 
"Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment," rule 606(b) allows juror 
testimony on the question of "whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear 
upon any juror." Utah R. Evid. 606(b). But the rule strictly prohibits juror testimony "as to 
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect 
of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent 
to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in 
connection therewith." 
Juror statements suggesting that some of the jurors were possibly confused about the 
unanimity requirement do not relate to "whether any outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror." Utah R. Evid. 606(b). Rather, they relate to a "matter or 
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations," precisely the kind of 
information prohibited by rule 606(b) and precedent. See, e.g., Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 
P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983) (evidence jury was confused or misunderstood or disregarded 
facts or applicable law inadmissible as violative of long-standing policy against attempts to 
undermine integrity of verdict); State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 248 n.4 (Utah 1992) 
(evidence to show jurors' opinions, surmises or processes of reasoning inadmissible by 
affidavit or testimony); State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1981) (trial court properly 
refused to receive juror affidavit because it did not allege verdict was determined "by chance 
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or as a result of bribery"); State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1972) (juror testimony that 
jurors discussed defendant's failure to take stand inadmissible); Johnson v. Simons, 551 P.2d 
515,516 (Utah 1976) (juror affidavits that jury was confused on law as stated in instructions 
were inadmissible). The trial court, therefore, properly declined to consider the proffered 
juror statements. 
III. 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
SUFFICIENCY CLAIM, WHERE HE FAILS TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE; IN ANY EVENT, THE EVIDENCE MORE THAN 
SUFFICED TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for 
exploiting prostitution and pattern of unlawful activity. Br. Aplt. 44-62. This Court should 
decline to review this claim because Defendant has not marshaled the evidence. Should this 
Court excuse Defendant's that failure, the evidence more than sufficed to support the jury's 
verdict on all counts. 
A. Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence. 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict, an appellate 
court views "the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 
1997). "Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, 
but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict." State v. Workman, 
852 P.2d 981,984 (Utah 1993). An appellate court will reverse ajury conviction only when 
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the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or she] was convicted." Brown, 948 
P.2d at 343 (citation omitted). Cf. State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, % 14, 210 P.3d 288. 
To prevail on a sufficiency challenge, the appellant must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewed in the light most favorable to 
the verdict, the evidence is insufficient. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 76,100 P.3d 1177. 
The marshaling burden is difficult. To properly discharge it, the appellant must present, "in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Chen, 2004 UT 82, \ 77 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). The appellant must then "ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). 
It is not enough to "simply provide an exhaustive review of all evidence presented at trial." 
Chen, 2004 UT 82, J^ 77 (citation omitted). "Rather, appellants must provide a precisely 
focused summary of all the evidence supporting the [challenged verdict]." Chen, 2004 UT 
82, Tf 77. Failure to meet the marshaling burden is grounds alone for rejecting an attack on 
the sufficiency of the evidence. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 
1991). 
Defendant has not met his marshaling burden. Although he recites some of the 
evidence against him, he does not present, "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
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scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists." Chen, 2004 UT 82, f 77 (citation omitted). Nor does he "ferret out a fatal 
flaw in the evidence." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. Instead, he reargues the 
credibility of the witnesses against him, see Br. Aplt. 12-13, 55-58, and draws all inferences 
from the evidence in his favor and against the jury's verdict, see Br. Aplt. 46-62. 
Defendant's failure to marshal is highlighted by his failure to acknowledge the trial 
court's denial of his arrest of judgment based on the "mountain of evidence" supporting the 
jury's verdict. R699; Add. B. Indeed, "[w]ithout attempting to create an exliaustive list" of 
the evidence supporting the verdict, the trial court set forth five pages of "marshaled" 
evidence. R700-05. The trial court then spent two more pages explaining how Defendant's 
"own marshaling of the evidence" supported the jury's verdict. R707-10. Defendant ignores 
the trial court's marshaling efforts and instead reargues the sufficiency of the evidence, cast 
in the light most favorable to his position. 
This Court should therefore reject Defendant's sufficiency challenges. 
B. The marshaled evidence supports four exploiting prostitution convictions. 
Should this Court excuse Defendant's failure to marshal, the evidence is more than 
sufficient to support Defendant's four exploiting prostitution convictions. 
1. The elements of exploiting prostitution. 
A person exploits prostitution if he: 
(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a house of 
prostitution for one who would be an inmate; 
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(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to become 
or remain a prostitute; 
(c) transports a person into or within this state with a purpose to promote 
that person's engaging in prostitution or procuring or paying for 
transportation with that purpose; 
(d) not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute, shares the proceeds 
of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to their understanding that he is to 
share therein; or 
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, alone or in 
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1). Prostitution includes engaging "in any sexual activity 
with another person for a fee." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302(l)(a). "Sexual activity" 
means "acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any sexual act involving the genitals of 
one person and the mouth or anus of another person." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(4). 
At the outset, Defendant argues that the trial court did not instruct the jury regarding 
the mental state for exploiting prostitution, which he argues is "purposeful." Br. Aplt. 60. 
Defendant, however, does not argue that he is entitled to a reversal based on the trial court's 
alleged failure to instruct the jury on the appropriate mental state. Id. Nor could he because, 
as explained in Point II.A above, he invited any error by affirmatively telling the trial court 
that other than an unrelated matter, he had no objections to the jury instructions. 
In any event, the jury was instructed on the mental state for exploiting prostitution. 
Instruction No. 36, which preceded the elements instructions for all of the charges, required 
that the jury find that Defendant acted at least knowingly: 
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The crime with which defendant is charged here involves the conduct 
of another person, in addition to himself. In order to find Defendant guilty, 
you must find that Defendant had knowledge of the wrongful or illegal 
conduct of the other person. If for instance, you find that a person committed 
prostitution while working in connection with Defendant']s escort agency, it 
is necessary for you to find that Defendant knew of that conduct in advance, or 
on an ongoing basis and that he encouraged it, in order to convict him of the 
crime charged. 
R293. By requiring the jury to find not only that Defendant knew of his escorts' illegal 
conduct, but also that he encouraged it, Instruction No. 36, in effect, required that the jury 
find that Defendant acted at least purposefully. 
2. The evidence supporting the elements of exploiting prostitution. 
The following evidence supports the jury verdict that Defendant knowingly or 
purposefully committed at least four counts of exploiting prostitution. 
Subsection (e). First, the evidence overwhelming proved that, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(l)(e), Defendant "own[ed], controlled], manage[d], supervise[d], 
or otherwise ke[pt], alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution or a 
prostitution business." The evidence established that Defendant and Ms. Curtis co-owned 
and operated the Doll House. R319:4,197. Defendant was the managing partner. R319:23; 
R320:257,262-63. Defendant set up a website to advertise their escort agency. R319:122. 
The website provided a link to "The Erotic Review" ("TER"), a national website where 
patrons posted reviews of escort agencies, including the Doll House. R319:16, 83; R320: 
308-10. Defendant regularly read reviews on TER which specified sex acts that Doll House 
escorts had performed. R319:83-85; R320:125-27, 308-11, 310-12. Defendant wrote his 
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own fictitious reviews of his escorts detailing sex acts that his escorts would be willing to 
perform. R319:l 16-17. Defendant and Ms. Curtis discussed bad reviews with the escorts in 
a company meeting and encouraged them to generate positive reviews. R319:114, 125-26. 
Poor reviews, which included "refusing to get naked" and "refusing to have sex," were "bad" 
for business. R319:85,114-15. Defendant and Ms. Curtis referred to escorts willing to have 
sex with a client as "bailers," because they were willing to "play ball." R319:87. 
Defendant knew that his escorts regularly engaged in sex acts for money, not only 
from the TER reviews, but because they regularly discussed their sexual services with him. 
See R319:87-88, 103; R320:187. Defendant was also present at a bachelor party where he 
took photos of two of his escorts performing oral sex on each other. R319:97-98. 
In addition to encouraging good TER reviews—which entailed a willingness to 
perform sex acts for money—Defendant also personally encouraged his escorts to prostitute 
themselves for less money than they wanted. For example, when Defendant learned that an 
escort had given a client only "a blow job" for a $400 tip, he told her that she needed to be 
"more liberal than that." R230:235-36. When another escort balked at having unprotected 
sex with a regular client for too little money, Defendant told her to go to a gas station, buy 
condoms, go back, and "make the guy happy." R320:186. 
In short, Defendant actively advertised and promoted his escorts as being willing to 
engage in sex acts for money. The jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence 
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that he did so to increase the number of appointments and, therefore, the volume of agency 
fees, that the Doll House received. 
Defendant nevertheless contends that the State never proved that he kept "a house of 
prostitution" or "prostitution business," within the meaning of the statute Br. Aplt. 47-49, 
53-55. "House of prostitution" is "a place where prostitution or promotion of prostitution is 
regularly carried on by one or more persons under the control, management, or supervision 
of another." Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1301(1). Defendant asserts that this definition means 
only a physical place at which acts of prostitution are committed. Br. Aplt. 47-48. In 
contrast, Defendant contends, the Doll House merely "sent escorts to multiple locations 
throughout Utah." Br. Aplt. 48. Defendant relies on the "common usage" of "house of 
prostitution" as used in the dictionary and on early to mid-twentieth century case law to 
support his argument. Id. 
But the plain language of the statute does not base its definition on whether the 
prostitute makes house calls or confines her work to one physical location. While the statute 
plainly covers a place where prostitution "is regularly carried on," it also covers a place 
where "promotion o/prostitution is carried on by one or more persons under the control, 
management, or supervision of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(1) (emphasis 
added). That definition clearly contemplates that the acts promoted could be committed 
elsewhere. 
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The evidence here showed that the "promotion of prostitution" was carried on from 
Ms. Curtis's Cottonwood home under the "control, management, or supervision" of 
Defendant and Ms. Curtis. Defendant took photos of all the escorts at the Cottonwood 
location to post on the Doll House webpage, which in turn provided a link to TER, 
describing the sex acts escorts were willing to engage in. In a search of the Cottonwood 
location, police found copies of TER reviews detailing the sex acts Doll House escorts would 
perform for money. R319:24. Appointments were made over the phone or through the 
Internet at the Cottonwood location. R319:19. Fees and tips from those appointments, 
which included sex acts for money, were paid out after each appointment at the Cottonwood 
address. State's Ex. 29; R319:95, 111-12,124,136;R320:212, 222. Defendant was nearly 
always there, often counting money, when the escorts returned from appointments. R319:95, 
124. Defendant also paid for the Doll House's business expenses from the Cottonwood 
address. R319:19-36. And, as noted, Defendant encouraged his escorts to perform sex acts 
for money. 
But even if Defendant's definition of "house of prostitution" were correct, subsection 
(e) also prohibits running a "prostitution business." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(l)(e). 
Although that term is not defined in the statute, its plain meaning surely encompasses a 
business that hires "escorts" and then promotes them as "prostitutes" on the Internet. 
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In short, the evidence was more than sufficient to prove that Defendant 
knowingly—or purposefully—owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept a 
house of prostitution or a prostitution business. 
Subsection (a). The evidence was also sufficient to support a finding under 
subsection (a) that Defendant "procure[d] an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a 
house of prostitution for one who would be an inmate." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(l)(a). 
An "inmate" means "a person who engages in prostitution in or through the agency of a 
house of prostitution." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(2). 
As stated, the Doll House fits within the statutory plain meaning of "house of 
prostitution." Likewise, the Doll House escorts fit within the statutory definition of 
"inmates," where they all testified that they engaged in prostitution through the agency of the 
Doll House. All the appointments in which the illegal sex acts testified to were made 
through the Doll House. Defendant tries to avoid the consequence of this fact by claiming 
that the Doll House contracted only for an escort "to show up and fully disrobe," and that 
any sex acts that occurred were from a second and separate contract solely between the 
escort and the client. Br. Aplt. 53. That argument ignores the fact that the escorts were 
required, in exchange for the agency fee of $ 145, to stay a full 50 minutes and that any "tips" 
for sex acts negotiated by the escort would be earned during that "agency" time. See State's 
Ex. 29 at 4, 6 (escort required to remain full 50 minutes and client could pay to extend the 
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time). It also ignores the fact that Defendant advertised his escorts' prostitution to increase 
the number of appointments that the Doll House could book. 
Here, the evidence established that Defendant procured inmates for his house of 
prostitution. He interviewed, photographed, hired, trained, and advertised the sexual 
repertoire of Doll House escorts. SeeR3l9:12, 80, 121;R320:164, 177, 181-82,209, 231-
32,269-70. He both knew that his escorts were prostituting themselves on appointments and 
encouraged them to do so. R319:125; R320:167, 183, 210, 234; see e.g., R319:125-28; 
R320:183-88, 233-36, 239. Five of the escorts testified that Defendant personally 
interviewed them before hiring. The evidence, therefore, supported at least four convictions 
under subsection (a). 
Subsection (b). The evidence was also sufficient to prove that Defendant 
"encourage[d], induce[d], or otherwise purposely cause[d] another to become or remain a 
prostitute." Defendant coached the escorts on how to avoid being arrested for prostitution 
R320:154. He offered to pay for their lawyer if they were arrested. R319:98; R320:155-56. 
As shown, he discussed their TER reviews with them and encouraged more services for less 
money. He told escorts when he thought they were charging too much for sexual activity 
and when they did not provide enough for the money received. He also operated a business 
that gave the escorts referrals based on how much of a tip his partner received from the 
sexual activity of the escorts. State's Ex. 29 at 5. Taken together, the above evidence 
amounted to encouraging and/or inducing another to become or remain a prostitute. 
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Defendant also encouraged one of his "top earners" to remain a prostitute by 
threatening her when she quit. R319:128-34. That escort testified that after receiving a 
threatening text from an ex-boyfriend, she sent Curtis a text message that she did not want to 
work for the Doll House any more. R319:129. When the escort did not respond to Curtis's 
text asking if they could do anything to work things out, Defendant began sending texts and 
leaving voice mail messages that if the escort "did not call him back.. . he was going to be 
forced to take some measures against [her]," for which "he could not be held responsible." 
R319:130-31. The escort did not call him back and, six months later, he carried through on 
this threat by sending a letter to her parents disclosing that she was a prostitute and attaching 
copies of her TER reviews, her MySpace page, and her photos on the Doll House website. 
R319:100,131-34; State' s Ex. 30. Defendant's threats amounted to encouraging or inducing 
someone to remain a prostitute.8 
The evidence was therefore sufficient to support at least one count of exploiting 
prostitution under subsection (b). 
Defendant argues that "encouraging someone to become or remain[] a prostitute 
refers to a change of status; not encouraging individual prostitution acts." Br. Aplt. 51-52. 
He asserts that no testimony shows that Defendant "encouraged anyone to change their status 
from nonprostitute to prostitute"; that he was "confronted by an employee contemplating 
reversion to nonprostitute from prostitute"; or that he "encouraged someone to continue in 
their prostitute status." Br. Aplt. 51-52. The State disagrees that the statutory language is so 
narrow. But, in any event, the acts detailed above—hiring, training, advertising, encouraging 
sex acts for less, giving more appointments to bigger tippers, and threatening an escort who 
wanted to quit—all amount to encouragement and inducements to continue prostituting 
themselves for his benefit. Such conduct falls well within the statutory plain language. 
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Subsection (c). The evidence more than sufficed to support at least one count that 
Defendant transported] a person into or within this state with a purpose to promote that 
person's engaging in prostitution... with that purpose." Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-1305(l)(c). 
One escort, Nicole Fernandez, testified that Defendant drove her to an appointment with a 
regular client. On the way Defendant told her that the client usually tipped $400 and that 
sexual activity—beyond a lap dance—would be expected. R320:233-34. When Ms. 
Fernandez later told Defendant that she had given the client a "blow job" for the $400 tip, he 
told her she needed to be "more liberal than that." R320:235-26. That testimony, which the 
jury presumably believed, was sufficient to prove one count that the Defendant transported a 
person with the purpose to promote her engaging in prostitution. 
Defendant seeks to undercut Ms. Fernandez's testimony by asking this Court to 
reassess her credibility. Br. Aplt. 55-58. But, as explained, an appellate court ordinarily will 
not reweigh or reassess a witness's credibility; rather it must resolve all conflicts in the 
evidence in favor of the jury verdict. Workman, 852 P.2d at 984. Defendant relies on State 
v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, f 14, 210 P.3d 288, to urge this Court to disregard Ms. Fernandez's 
testimony. Br. Aplt. 55-58. Defendant's reliance is misplaced. 
Robbins reaffirmed that in a sufficiency challenge, an appellate court reviews "the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict." Robbins, 2009 UT 23, \ 14 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). It also confirmed that a jury "can convict on the basis of the 
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uncorroborated testimony of the victim." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
The Robbins court stated, however, that a trial court may, when considering a motion to 
arrest judgment, "reevaluate the jury's determination of testimony credibility in cases 'where 
a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or the result of 
coercion, and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence.'" Id. at f^ 18 (quoting 
Bowles v. Indiana, 111 N.E2d 1150, 1152 (Ind. 2000)). 
Defendant argues that Ms. Fernandez's testimony falls within that category of 
inherent improbability because she had a motive to lie, her trial testimony contradicted her 
prior statements to police, and she testified at trial that she had sex with more Doll House 
clients than she had admitted to at the preliminary hearing. Br. Aplt. 55-57. 
Ms. Fernandez's testimony, however, falls well outside that contemplated as 
inherently improbable by Robbins. First, she was not the "sole witness" against Defendant. 
Rather, her testimony of Defendant's encouragement to engage in sex acts for money was 
generally corroborated by many other witnesses. Indeed, Defendant himself testified that he 
"occasionally" drove escorts to their appointments. R320:294. He just denied that he 
knowingly drove them to a location where a sex act was committed. Id. Given the 
overwhelming testimony that Defendant both knew about and encouraged acts of 
prostitutions, Defendant's testimony was far more improbable than Ms. Fernandez's. 
Second, Ms. Fernandez's testimony was not "inherently contradictory," "equivocal," 
or the "result of coercion." Robbins, 2009 UT 23, Tf 18. Ms. Fernandez's trial testimony was 
59 
internally consistent and largely consistent with her preliminary hearing testimony. 
Compare R320:230-51 with R81:66-90. Although she initially told police that she did not 
have sex with any Doll House client, she explained that this was because she was afraid the 
police would charge her if she admitted to doing so. R 320:245-47, 250-51. 
Finally, a trial court's denial of a sufficiency claim in an arrest of judgment lends 
support to the jury's verdict. Id. at ^ f 15. The trial court, here, having had the opportunity to 
see all the witnesses testify, did not find Ms. Fernandez's testimony inherently improbable. 
R697-707. 
In short, Ms. Fernandez's testimony was not "inherently improbable" such that the 
trial court was required to disregard it. The evidence was therefore sufficient to support a 
conviction for transporting a prostitute for the purpose of promoting her engaging in 
prostitution. 
Subsection (d). Finally, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that 
Defendant "share[d] the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to their 
understanding that he is to share therein." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(l)(d). 
Defendant contends that no evidence supports a finding that he shared in any proceeds 
of prostitution pursuant to any agreement because the $95 agency fee that went to company 
was only for the escort to "show up and fully disrobe." Br. Aplt. 53. He contends that any 
tips for sexual activity were strictly the result of private negotiations between the escort and 
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the client. Br. Aplt. 53. He also insists that while Ms. Curtis received a percentage of those 
tips, he never did. Br. Aplt. 52-53. 
Defendant misstates the true nature of his business and how proceeds were shared. 
First, as noted, the set agency fee of $145 guaranteed a client 50 minutes of a naked escort's 
time. The Doll House received $95—over half—of the set agency fee, while the escort 
received only $50. To earn more, the escort needed to ear "tips" for sex acts. She 
performed those sex acts during the 50 minutes already purchased from the Doll House. 
Indeed, according to the policy manual, a client could pay an additional agency fee if he 
wished to extend the time with the escort. State's Ex. 29 at 6. Thus, Defendant shared in the 
proceeds of prostitution pursuant to an understanding with the prostitute. 
Second, the evidence showed that Defendant advertised the sex acts his escorts were 
willing to perform to increase the number of appointments booked, thereby increasing the 
volume of agency fees. Again, the agency fee included proceeds of prostitution and 
Defendant shared in those proceeds pursuant to an understanding with the prostitute. 
Finally, although not necessary to the analysis, one escort testified that she saw 
Defendant commingling the agency fee with the tips paid to Ms. Curtis. R320:226-27. That 
testimony supported a finding that Defendant shared in the proceeds of prostitution pursuant 
to an understanding with the prostitute. 
In sum, the testimony overwhelmingly established that Defendant was guilty of at 
least four counts of exploiting prostitution. 
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C. The evidence was more than sufficient to support Defendant's conviction 
of engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity. 
Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his pattern of 
unlawful activity conviction. Br. Aplt. 59-62. 
An "unlawful activity" means "to directly engage in conduct or to solicit, request, 
command, encourage, or intentionally aid another person to engage in conduct which would 
constitute any offense described by the following crimes or categories of crimes, or to 
attempt or conspire to engage in an act which would constitute any of those offenses . . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. 76-10-1602(4). Exploiting prostitution is one of the listed offenses. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(4)(aaaa). 
A "'[pjattern of unlawful activity' means engaging in conduct which constitutes the 
commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not isolated, 
but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of 
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1602(2). Thus, the State had to prove that Defendant engaged in at least three 
episodes of exploiting prostitution. 
The State then had to prove one of the following: 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived 
whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the 
person has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, 
any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived 
from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest 
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise; 
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(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to 
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any 
enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of 
Subsection (1), (2), or (3). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603. 
Defendant asserts, with no explanation or supporting citations to the record, that "the 
State failed to prove the three predicate episodes—episodes limited to the charged conduct 
contained with the Information—required by a Pattern of Unlawful Activity's definition." 
Br. Aplt. 59. But, as shown above, the State did prove at least three episodes of exploiting 
prostitution. 
Defendant next contends that the State "failed to prove a nexus between a Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity and an enterprise as required by law." Br. Aplt. 59. Specifically, 
Defendant argues that the State did not introduce evidence that Defendant used profits from 
exploiting prostitution "to acquire, establish or operate any enterprise"; or that he "acquired 
or maintained, either directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise 
through Exploiting Prostitution"; or that he "directly or indirectly conducted or participated 
in any enterprise's affairs through Exploiting Prostitution." Br. Aplt. 59. 
Contrary to Defendant's claims, ample evidence at trial proved that Defendant used 
profits from exploiting prostitution to operate or maintain an enterprise, i.e., the Doll House. 
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See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(1) (defining "enterprise" as including any "partnership, 
corporation, business trust,... or other legal entity"). As explained above, the Doll House's 
set agency fees constituted proceeds of exploiting prostitution. The State produced 
substantial evidence that Defendant used those proceeds to pay business expenses of the Doll 
House, including advertising, phone bills, and purchasing cars. R319:7-36; R320:306-08. 
The evidence was therefore sufficient to support Defendant's pattern of unlawful 
activity conviction. 
IV. 
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR ON HIS CLAIM THAT AN 
ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION CREATED A FATAL 
VARIANCE FROM THE INFORMATION 
Defendant finally claims that Jury Instruction No. 37, the elements instruction for 
pattern of unlawful activity, created a fatal variance with the information. Br. Aplt. 62-64. 
Defendant invited any error by affirmatively representing that other than an unrelated issue, 
he had no objection to the jury instructions. 
Count I of the information expressly charged Defendant with violating the first three 
subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602. R8-9. It did not cite to subsection (4) which 
provides that it is unlawful "for any person to conspire to violate any provision of Subsection 
(1), (2), or (3). Id. Count I, however, did state that Defendant "committed an act or acts in 
the pursuance of such attempt or conspiracy" between July 1,2004 and April 30,2006. R9. 
The pattern of unlawful activity elements instruction listed all four subsections of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1602, as alternative bases for convicting Defendant of Count I. R. Defendant 
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contends that giving the jury an alternative basis not included in the inforaiation created a 
fatal variance. Br. Aplt. 63-64. 
Just as Defendant invited any error to the unanimity instructions, see Point II.A, he 
invited any error on this instruction. As stated, defense counsel affirmatively represented to 
the trial court that the only objection he had to the instructions was on an unrelated issue. R 
320:33-41. Then later, when the jury sent out a question asking about the alternatives in this 
very instruction, he told the trial court that the instructions were adequate and he urged the 
court to simply respond that the jury should re-read the instructions. R863-64. 
Defendant's invited error forecloses appellate review.9 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
9
 In any event, it is difficult to see how Defendant suffered any prejudice. A variance 
in the information implicates notice. See State v. Kirgan, 712 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1985). 
Here, the information put Defendant on notice that the State was also relying on a 
"conspiracy55 theory. R8-9. More importantly, any defense to the fourth variation—which 
prohibited a conspiracy to commit the other three variations—was necessarily subsumed in 
the defense to the charged variations. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 10. Trial by Jury 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. 
In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all 
other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight 
persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of 
jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than 
four persons. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In 
civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in 
civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. Rights of Accused Persons 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be 
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided 
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at 
any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-1. Time and Place of Alleged 
Offense—Specification 
The prosecuting attorney, on timely written demand of the 
defendant, shall within ten days, or such other time as the court may 
allow, specify in writing as particularly as is known to him the place, 
date and time of the commission of the offense charged. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301. Definitions 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "House of prostitution" means a place where prostitution or 
promotion of prostitution is regularly carried on by one or more 
persons under the control, management, or supervision of another. 
(2) "Inmate" means a person who engages in prostitution in or 
through the agency of a house of prostitution. 
(3) "Public place" means any place to which the public or any 
substantial group of the public has access. 
(4) "Sexual activity" means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, 
or any sexual act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth 
or anus of another person, regardless of the sex of either participant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302. Prostitution 
(1) A person is guilty of prostitution when: 
(a) he engages in any sexual activity with another person for a 
fee; 
(b) is an inmate of a house of prostitution; or 
(c) loiters in or within view of any public place for the purpose 
of being hired to engage in sexual activity. 
(2) Prostitution is a class B misdemeanor. However, any person who 
is convicted a second time, and on all subsequent convictions, under 
this section or under a local ordinance adopted in compliance with 
Section 76-10-1307 is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as 
provided in Section 76-10-1309. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304. Aiding Prostitution 
(1) A person is guilty of aiding prostitution if he: 
(a) solicits a person to patronize a prostitute; 
(b) procures or attempts to procure a prostitute for a patron; 
(c) leases or otherwise permits a place controlled by the actor, 
alone or in association with another, to be used for prostitution 
or the promotion of prostitution; or 
(d) solicits, receives, or agrees to receive any benefit for doing 
any of the acts prohibited by this subsection. 
(2) Aiding prostitution is a class B misdemeanor. However, a person 
who is convicted a second time, and on all subsequent convictions, 
under this section or under a local ordinance adopted in compliance 
with Section 76-10-1307 is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305. Exploiting Prostitution 
(1) A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he: 
(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a 
house of prostitution for one who would be an inmate; 
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another 
to become or remain a prostitute; 
(c) transports a person into or within this state with a purpose 
to promote that person's engaging in prostitution or procuring 
or paying for transportation with that purpose; 
(d) not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute, shares 
the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to their 
understanding that he is to share therein; or 
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, 
alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution or 
a prostitution business. 
(2) Exploiting prostitution is a felony of the third degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602. Definitions 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, 
partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal 
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities. 
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity" means engaging in conduct which 
constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful 
activity, which episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar 
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or 
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken 
together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct 
and be related either to each other or to the enterprise. At least one of 
the episodes comprising a pattern of unlawful activity shall have 
occurred after July 31, 1981. The most recent act constituting part of a 
pattern of unlawful activity as defined by this part shall have occurred 
within five years of the commission of the next preceding act alleged 
as part of the pattern. 
(3) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a 
legal or beneficial interest in property, including state, county, and 
local governmental entities. 
(4) "Unlawful activity" means to directly engage in conduct or to 
solicit, request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid another 
person to engage in conduct which would constitute any offense 
described by the following crimes or categories of crimes, or to 
attempt or conspire to engage in an act which would constitute any of 
those offenses, regardless of whether the act is in fact charged or 
indicted by any authority or is classified as a misdemeanor or a 
felony: 
...(aaaa) prostitution, Section 76-10-1302; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603. Unlawful Acts 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds 
derived, whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful 
activity in which the person has participated as a principal, to use or 
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds 
of the income, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use of 
those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the 
establishment or operation of, any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity 
to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control 
of any enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in 
the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful 
activity. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision 
of Subsection (1), (2), or (3). 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4. Prosecution of Public Offenses 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by 
indictment or information sworn to by a person having reason to 
believe the offense has been committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which 
the defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the 
offense by common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms 
the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of 
the charge. An information may contain or be accompanied by a 
statement of facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the 
offense charged where appropriate. Such things as time, place, 
means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged 
unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, 
securities, written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may 
be described by any name or description by which they are generally 
known or by which they may be identified without setting forth a 
copy. However, details concerning such things may be obtained 
through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters 
of judicial notice need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an 
indictment or information. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be 
amended at any time before verdict if no additional or different 
offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be 
amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to bar a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of 
facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are 
required to inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense 
charged, so as to enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant 
may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion shall be 
filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time 
as the court may permit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the 
filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or 
supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as justice may 
require. The request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall be 
limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the 
essential elements of the particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because 
any name contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or 
proviso contained in the statute creating or defining the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their 
usual meaning unless they are otherwise defined by law or have 
acquired a legal meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not 
invalidate the indictment or information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or 
information was based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. 
Failure to endorse shall not affect the validity but endorsement shall 
be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. Upon request 
the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, 
furnish the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names 
are not so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing 
it to appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer 
or counsel. Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as 
against a natural person. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). Instructions 
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the 
instructions are given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may 
be made after they are given to the jury, but before the jury retires to 
consider its verdict. The court shall provide an opportunity to make 
objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless a party objects to an 
instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may 
not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. In 
stating the objection the party shall identify the matter to which the 
objection is made and the ground of the objection. 
Utah R. Evid. 606(b). Competency of Juror as Witness 
(b) Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an 
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not 
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of 
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any 
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or 
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's 
mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may 
testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information 
was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside 
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a 
juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning 
a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be 
received for these purposes. 
ADDENDUM B 
Trial Court's Ruling Denying Motion to Arrest Judgment 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 061906590 
vs. : 
S. STEVEN MAESE, : Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendant. : 
The Court has before it the defendant S. Steven Maese's ("Mr. 
Maese") Motion for Arrest of Judgment and/or For a New Trial. The 
matters have been fully and extensively briefed and the parties argued 
the matter before the Court on October 27, 2008. The matter is now ready 
for decision. 
BACKGROUND 
On July 11, 2008, after a two day jury trial, the jury returned 
guilty verdicts against Mr. Maese in the above-entitled matter on the 
following counts: 
Count I - Pattern of Unlawful Activity, a Second Degree Felony 
Counts II, III, IV, V - Exploiting Prostitution, Third Degree 
Felonies 
The jury acquitted Mr. Maese on Count VI, Money Launderinq, a Second 
Degree Felony. The charges arose as a result of Mr. Maese's ownership 
and operation of an escort service named the "Doll House," which was a 
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sexually oriented business, licensed in Park City, Summit County, Utah.1 
The Doll House, however, under Mr. Maese's ownership, was operated out 
of a residence in Cottonwood Heights, located in Salt Lake County, where 
the co-owner of the business, Tiffany Curtis ("Ms. Curtis"), resided. 
While the Doll House held itself out to be an escort service, the 
overwhelming weight of evidence produced at trial indicated it provided 
more client services than merely those associated with an escort service, 
but rather services which included sex acts, and the owners, the escorts 
and their clientele understood, or came to understand quite quickly, that 
prostitution was a service the Doll House and its escorts provided, and 
that anywhere from 50% to 90% of the Doll House customers fully expected 
and received some type of sexual activity from a Doll House escort. 
Legal Discussion 
A. Motion to Arrest Judgment 
At the conclusion of the trial, and prior to sentencing, Mr. Maese 
filed a Motion in Arrest of Judgment, or, in the Alternative, a Motion 
for a New Trial. Motions to arrest Judgment are governed by Utah Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 23: 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court 
upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant 
!Mr. Maese owned the Doll House with his then girlfriend, Tiffany Curtis, who had 
formerly worked as an escort, and had advised Mr. Maese about the "business" opportunities 
associated with an escort service. The Doll House was licensed in Park City, and maintained a 
small office there, but did no actual business from the Park City location. 
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shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not 
constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, 
or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment.... 
Under Rule 23, a trial court should arrest Judgment if the evidence 
presented by the State or admitted to by a defendant "is so inconclusive 
or so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element," that 
is, if it is factually insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict. 
See, State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) . Thus, when Mr. 
Maese attacks the jury's verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, or lack 
of unanimity, it may be considered under Rule 23 prior to being 
sentenced. Mr. Maese urges the Court that it should arrest Judgment both 
because of the alleged insufficiency of the evidence and the lack of 
unanimity of the jury verdict. 
B. Motion for a New Trial2 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the basis 
upon which a new trial may be granted. The Court may grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if "there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." 
2The State correctly notes that a Motion for New Trial should be filed after sentencing. 
SPPJ "Rule ?4(r.) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. While Mr. Maese concurs with the 
State's assessment, he argues that Rule 23 permits a trial Court to exercise "wide discretion" in 
any considerations for the arrest of judgment, and that his arguments may be considered for both. 
This Court will consider all of the arguments of Mr. Maese without worrying whether the Motion 
for a New Trial could be considered now or later. 
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Mr. Maese urges the Court to grant him a new trial because of the 
same two bases as set forth above, and various errors he ascribes to the 
Court, including not ruling upon, or compelling the State, to provide a 
bill of particulars, permitting evidence to be presented to the jury of 
one of the escort's non-consensual sex acts, allowing the jury to 
consider four alternative statutory prongs as a basis for the Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity charge, permitting the introduction of a letter 
addressed to the parents of one of the escorts, penned by Mr. Maese, and 
actions or remarks by the prosecutor which Mr. Maese alleges was 
prosecutorial misconduct and which therefore prejudiced the trial. Mr. 
Maese alleges that any one of these issues had a ''substantial adverse 
effect" upon his rights. The Court will address each of these arguments 
herein. 
1. Sufficient Evidence was Adduced by the State at Trial that Mr. Maese 
is Guilty of the Counts Charged Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. 
Notwithstanding the mountain of evidence provided at trial and the 
jury's verdict of guilt, Mr. Maese now urges the Court that such evidence 
was insufficient to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of his 
guilt. In the face of this evidence, it is as if Mr. Maese is asking the 
Court to look squarely into the brightness of an unobscured noonday sun 
and then seek to persuade tne Court that the sun does noc exist. Such 
is the quantum of evidence provided at trial to support the jury verdict. 
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- Without attempting to create an exhaustive list of the evidence 
provided at trial which supports the jury verdict on each of the 
respective counts, the following is a summary of the evidence provided 
at trial concerning the nature of the Doll House's business and the 
knowledge of Mr. Maese about the purpose of the business. 
(a) After creation of the Doll House as a business, Mr. Maese and 
Ms. Curtis advertised it on a website which provided a link to a site 
entitled "The Erotic Review," which was a national posting of reviews of 
the places around the country where "erotic" escorts, massages, strip 
clubs, and "gentlemen clubs" could be located and the various types of 
"service" the clientele could expect from the individuals involved with 
a business such as the Doll House. (Trial Tr. Day 1 ("Tl") 16.) Mr. 
Maese put together the Doll House website, monitored the "reviews" his 
escorts received (Tl 84) , wrote his own fictitious reviews of the sexual 
acts his escorts would perform for paying clients (Tl 117) and discussed 
bad reviews with the escorts to encourage them to generate "positive" 
reviews (Tl 114-15). He specifically spoke to the escorts that refusing 
sex was bad for business and would result in a bad review. (Tl 125-27) 
(b) The Doll House employed numerous women as escorts, who were 
sent to various appointments, in which they were required to become 
eomplr^t-e-ly naked, iT-rial Transcript Day 2 ("T2") 2 7 0 ) Whi1.fi Mr. Maese 
created a "Policy & Procedures Handbook" for the Doll House that 
explicitly prohibited sexual acts, it was understood that sex was the 
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service the Doll House provided.3 This was certainly true as to the 
owners, Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis, who did all they could to make the Doll 
House a successful and lucrative concern. Financial success for an 
escort and for the Doll House involved sexual activity. 
(c) Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis often obtained the details of the 
escort's individual appointments, including the following low lights: 
(i) one escort noted to Mr. Maese that during an appointment 
where she performed oral sex the client "tasted" disgusting. (Tl 87-88) ; 
(ii) another escort complained to Mr. Maese that other escorts 
were not charging enough for sex so clients were reluctant to pay her the 
price she demanded for sex (Tl 103) , to which Mr. Maese told her that the 
fee she charged for sex was too much. (Tl 103, T2 187); and 
3
 A theme of Mr. Maese's defense was, that while escorts may have engaged in sex acts, 
he was oblivious to such activity and he presumed the business was only providing escort 
services that did not involve sex acts. Indeed, as part of his defense, Mr. Maese introduced 
evidence at trial that he had drafted a "policy and procedure manual" that explained that sex acts 
were not allowed by law or by the Doll House, and held at least two quarterly business meetings 
where escorts were trained by a legal professional as to what legally could or could not be done 
as an escort. As will be seen by a cursory review of the evidence, this was a facade, as the 
evidence suggests Mr. Maese fully understood sex was part of the service the Doll House 
provided, he actively participated in "marketing" the types of sexual activity individual escorts 
would perform by creating fictitious reviews by supposed satisfied clientele, encouraged the 
escorts to provide the sex acts the clients demanded, and demanded that his escorts satisfy the 
clients and obtain "good" reviews from their clientele. The idea that sex acts were not permitted 
is more appropriately called a "wink, wink" defense, wherein Mr. Maese tells an escort not to do 
something, but fully expects them to do exactly that. 
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(iii) Mr. Maese told the escorts to "keep the guys happy but 
whatever happens between you guys is between you guys" (Tl 152-53); 
(iv) Mr. Maese attended a bachelor party with two of his 
escorts where oral sex was performed with clients. Mr. Maese accompanied 
the escorts to the event and called the Doll House to report they had 
arrived and collected the Doll House fee (Tl 97-98); 
(v) Mr. Maese told an escort during a dispute with a "regular" 
client over the fee for sexual intercourse that she was to go to a gas 
station, purchase condoms and go back and make the guy happy because he 
was a "regular." (T2 186); 
(vi) An escort told Mr. Maese that she had performed oral sex 
for $400 and Mr. Maese responded that for $400 she would need "to be a 
little more liberal than that." (T2 235-36); and 
(vii) In a dispute with an escort who left the Doll House to 
work with a competitor, Mr. Maese drafted and sent a letter to the 
escort's parents highlighting the sexual activities she had engaged in 
while an escort at the Doll House, which letter included photographs and 
the "reviews" she had received from The Erotic Review. (Tl 100-02, 133-
35) 
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(viii) Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis referred to the escorts who 
were willing to have sex with a client as "bailers" and/or that they 
would uplay ball." (Testimony of Ms. Curtis)4 
(ix) Mr. Maese was present at least 70% of the time when one 
escort returned from appointments and paid the agency fee and was seen 
by this escort handling and wrapping the money in rubber bands. 
(Testimony of Allison H.)5 
(x) A typical escort would do three to four dates a day, 
worked a 5 0 hour work week and engaged in sexual activity on 
approximately 50% of the appointments. (Testimony of Jennifer H.) 
(xi) One escort was involved in a non-consensual sex act from 
a regular client and she informed Mr. Maese, and he responded that the 
Doll House would never provide services to that client again. (Testimony 
of Heather T,) 
(xii) The witnesses testified that from 30% to 90% of the 
appointments scheduled by the Doll House involved sexual acts. 
(Testimony of Allison H., Jennifer H. , Heather W. , Danielle T. , Allison 
J.) 
4Where the Court cites to testimony rather than to a reference in the trial transcript, it is 
b^Ga^se-the Court does not have a triaLtoanscri-ptand is relying on its own trial notes. Where a 
trial transcript is referenced, it has been taken from the briefs of one of the litigants. 
5The witnesses who were escorts at the Doll House will be referred to in this Decision by 
their first name and last initial. 
STATE V. MAESE PAGE 9 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(xiii) Mr. Maese arranged some of the escort appointments with 
clients and drove the escorts to the location. (Testimony of Nicole F.) 
(xiv) In addition to a Doll House fee of $95 for each 
appointment, the escorts paid Ms. Curtis, the appointment scheduler, a 
"tip" of from ten to twenty percent of any additional money the escort 
earned from engaging in sex acts, which was commingled with Doll House 
fees. (T2 222, 226). 
(xv) The more utip" Ms. Curtis and the Doll House received 
from an escort, the more appointments the escort received. (T2 149-50, 
182) 
(xvi) The Erotic Review, reviewed and supplemented by Mr. 
Maese, detailed the sex acts the Doll House escorts performed. (Tl 12-
16, 82-84, 114-115, 127) 
(xvii) Mr. Maese checked the reviews of his escorts in The 
Erotic Review daily and discussed with Ms. Curtis and the escorts their 
respective reviews. (Tl 84, 114-115, 117, 125-27) 
(xviii) During the execution of a search warrant on the Doll 
House, law enforcement discovered hard copies of The Erotic Review which 
detailed the sexual repertoire of the Doll House escorts. (Tl 23) 
(xix) During the execution of a search warrant on the Doll 
He-use, law e-nf oreemenrt retrieved escort srhpHnlp li^t- f^ p.sr.nrt. 
appointment lists, business application for the Doll House signed by Mr. 
Maese, and Doll House financial accounts signed by Mr. Maese, as well as 
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financial records of money transfers from the Doll House to Mr. Maese's 
personal financial account. (Testimony of Detective Dan Bartlett) 
(xx) Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis abandoned the quarterly 
discussions with escorts about prohibitions against sex on appointments 
because they "did not want the girls to think that they would get in 
trouble...if they were to have sex on an appointment." (Tl 72-80) 
(xxi) In a meeting with all the escorts, Mr. Maese went over 
The Erotic Review, and encouraged the escorts to work harder, provide 
more "services" for less money and generate better reviews so the Doll 
House could become the best escort service in Salt Lake City. (Testimony 
of Allison J.) 
(xxii) Mr. Maese spoke to one escort on strategies to employ 
to avoid getting busted for illegal sexual activity. (Testimony of 
Jennifer H.) 
(xxiii) The escorts felt pressure to provide sex on their 
appointments from the Doll House owners. (Testimony of Jennifer H.) 
* * * 
When a Court is asked to review a jury verdict on the grounds that 
the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, the Court is to: 
...review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of 
-the—jury. We—reverse—a—jury—conviction—for—insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
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State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232; 236 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).) 
As set forth in this Court's summary recitation of the evidence, 
there is nothing insufficient or inconclusive in the evidence the State 
presented of Mr. Maese's guilt to support his conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Evidence of guilt is sufficient when a jury, based on 
the evidence, may find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant 
committed the charged offenses. State v. Murphy, 617 P. 2d 399, 402 (Utah 
1980) . Each piece of evidence does not need to be sufficient, in and of 
itself, to support a jury finding of guilt. State v. Gurr, 904 P. 2d 238, 
241-42 (Utah App. 1995). Rather, a court is to review the evidence in 
its totality to determine whether the totality of facts is sufficient to 
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
In Gurr, the defendant argued that his conviction was not supported 
by sufficient evidence. id. at 240. To support his arguments, he 
isolated each piece of evidence presented by the prosecution, arguing 
that each by itself was insufficient to convict him. I_d. at 242. The 
court rejected his arguments stating, "Although Gurr offers alternative 
explanations for pieces of the evidence, those explanations would require 
us to view the evidence as individual still frames rather than a whole 
moving picture. " XcL. 
Mr. Maese is asking this Court to engage in the same limited view 
of each piece of evidence against him. But viewing the evidence in its 
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totality, the jury correctly found that Mr. Maese knew the escorts 
working for him were performing sex acts for money, that he accepted 
money they received from the work, and that he encouraged them to 
prostitute themselves. Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1305, provides that a 
person may be found guilty of exploiting prostitution if he: 
(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in 
a house of prostitution...; 
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another 
to become or remain a prostitute; 
(c) transports a person...within this state with a purpose to 
promote that person engaging in prostitution...; 
(d) ...shares the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute 
pursuant to their understanding that he is to share therein; 
or 
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, 
alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution 
or a prostitution business. 
In the face of the quantum of evidence presented at trial it is an 
impossible task for Mr. Maese to argue that the quantum of evidence is 
insufficient or inconclusive as to his guilt. The impossibility of that 
task is only highlighted by each of the pieces of evidence Mr. Maese 
tries to explain away. Indeed, from Mr. Maese7 s own marshaling of the 
evidence and arguments thereon, one may conclude that: 
(i) Mr. Maese encouraged an escort who was unwilling to have 
unprotected sex to go get some condoms, work it out and make "the guy 
happy." Exploitation of Prostitution may be proven by encouraging, 
inducing or causing a person to become or remain a prostitute; 
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(ii) Unhappy with a different escort who left the Doll House, 
Mr. Maese sent a letter to her parents detailing her sexual activity as 
an escort for the Doll House. Exploitation of Prostitution may be proven 
by the ownership, control or management of a prostitution business; 
(iii) Mr. Maese received proceeds from a sexual encounter by 
a Doll House escort for which she was forced to perform a sexual act for 
less than she demanded, and received money from the escorts from their 
appointments. Exploitation of Prostitution may be shown by the sharing 
of proceeds of prostitution. 
(iv) Mr. Maese maintained a house of prostitution by setting 
up a website, handling advertisements, writing reviews of his escorts on 
The Erotic Review which contained information about sexual activity. 
Exploitation of Prostitution may be shown by owning, controlling, 
managing or supervising a prostitution business. 
Furthermore, the "low lights" list of activity stated above, the 
State provided sufficient and conclusive evidence to support claims 
against Mr. Maese for exploiting prostitution, including the following*. 
(a) Procuring an individual to enaaae in -prostitution : 
Mr. Maese interviewed, photographed, hired, trained and advertised for 
the Doll House escorts. Without exception, each of the escorts were 
interviewed and—-hir^ ed by Mr^—Macsc . Gnc escort was drawn to th-a—Doll 
House for employment by an ad she saw for the Doll House in a weekly 
newspaper. (Testimony of Allison J.) 
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(b) Encouraging another to Become or Remain a Prostitute: 
Mr. Maese coached the escorts on what they could do to avoid being 
busted, he discussed their Erotic Reviews and encouraged better service 
for less money, commented on their pricing for sexual services if he felt 
it was too much or if they needed to provide more service for the price 
received, told them to keep their customers satisfied, and operated a 
business that gave the escorts referrals based on how much of a tip the 
Doll House received for the sexual activity of its escorts. 
(c) Transports a person with purpose to promote prostitution: 
Mr. Maese drove escorts to several appointments, at one of which he 
remained to take photographs. 
(d) Shares in proceeds of prostitution: Mr. Maese and the Doll 
House collected tips from sexual activity of his escorts along with the 
standard agency fees. 
(e) Owned or controlled a prostitution business : Mr. Maese 
owned, operated and oversaw the business operation of the Doll House. 
After a review of the evidence, this Court concludes that the jury 
had sufficient and conclusive evidence as to the counts of Exploiting 
Prostitution to find Mr. Maese guilty on those charges. There is neither 
good cause to arrest the Judgment nor any error or impropriety that had 
a—s-ubs-feantial—adverse—e-f-fect upon Mr.—Ma-ese' s—rights—to warrant—a new 
trial. 
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As to the charge of Pattern of Unlawful Activity, those same facts 
support this Court's conclusion that the jury had sufficient and 
conclusive evidence as to the count for a Pattern of Unlawful Activity. 
2. Mr. Maese Received a Unanimous Verdict From the Jury 
Mr. Maese seeks to introduce evidence of jurors' statements that 
they were confused during deliberations by the Court's instructions 
regarding the specific acts that constitute Exploitation of Prostitution 
and their duty of returning a unanimous verdict. 
Mr. Maese argues that his verdict was not a unanimous verdict from 
the jury as three jurors expressed some confusion during deliberations 
concerning the jury instructions as it related to what specific acts may 
be found by the jury in order to return a verdict on a count of 
Exploitation of Prostitution. 
As previously noted, one may be guilty of Exploiting Prostitution 
under five alternative categories of the crime. They include: 
(a) procuring an inmate for a house of prostitution; 
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another 
to become or remain a prostitute; 
(c) transports a person into or within this state, with the 
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution...; 
(d) nuL beiny d. child or legal dependent of a-p-restitutc chare 
the proceeds of prostitution...; or 
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(e) owns, controls, manages supervises or otherwise keeps, 
alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution or a 
prostitution business. 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1305 (1953, as amended.) 
During the jury deliberations, the jurors sent out the following 
question in referring to the elements section of the instruction on 
Exploiting Prostitution: 
Jury Question: In instruction #37, a, b, c, d, do all of them 
have to be fulfilled in order to find the defendant guilty or 
just one of the conditions met? Also the same question for 
instruction #40. 
The Court, after consultation with respective counsel submitted the 
following: 
Answer: Both instructions 37 and 40's subparagraphs (the a, b, 
C s) you refer to end with the word "or" and therefore should 
be read accordingly. 
Mr. Maese's argument is that the jury may have found him guilty on 
different categories of the offense, but not unanimously on the same 
category. Mr. Maese's argument is unpersuasive both based on the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and on case law. 
(i) Utah Rule of Evidence 606 Precludes Consideration of Juror Statements 
Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) forbids the use of juror statements Mr. 
Maese gathered as to matters occurring during deliberations. Rule 606(b) 
states in part: 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, 
a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement 
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occurring during the course of the jury's 
deliberations. ..except that a juror may testify on the 
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any 
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any 
juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any 
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the 
juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these 
purposes. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah law is clear as to the strictness of this rule. See, State v. Gee, 
498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 1972) (specifying that juror testimony or 
affidavits may not be received to impeach the jury verdict) . All of the 
statements provided by defense counsel allude to matters and statements 
which occurred and were made during the course of the jury's 
deliberations. Therefore, they may not be received for the purposes of 
impeaching the verdict in seeking a new trial. 
Rule 606(b) allows for consideration of juror testimony only to the 
extent that it may suggest the entry of "extraneous prejudicial 
information7' in deliberations. The mere fact that several jurors were 
confused as to their duty of unanimity as to a specific crime and as to 
each element of that crime does not qualify as extraneous prejudicial 
information or improper influence for admission under Rule 606(b), 
especially where that confusion was specifically addressed by the trial 
court and resolved. The Utah Supreme court has expressly held: 
TIT—a—long—3r±ire—of—decisions—in—thirs—jurisdiction, the 
principle has been firmly established that evidence by 
affidavit or testimony of a juror will not be received to 
impeach or question the jury verdict or to show the grounds 
upon which it was rendered, or to show their misunderstanding-
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of fact or law, or that they misunderstood the charge of the 
court, or the effect of their verdict, or their opinions, 
surmises and processes of reasoning in arriving at a verdict. 
State v. Gee, supra at 665-66 (emphasis added) ; see also, Johnson v. 
Simons, 551 P.2d 515, 516 (Utah 1976) (refusing juror affidavits 
indicating that jury was confused as to law stated in instructions) . The 
introduction of such evidence is expressly barred by Rule 606(b) and by 
the clear statements of the Utah Supreme Court. 
(ii) Utah Case Law Precludes Consideration of Juror Statements 
Mr. Maese cites Resolution Trust Cory, v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1548 
(10th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that Federal Rule 606(b) is silent 
as to questioning the jury to confirm the accuracy of the verdict, and 
therefore should not preclude the testimony as to a potential 
miscommunication of the verdict. The Utah version of Rule 606(b) also 
does not specifically preclude evidence of verdict miscommunication. 
However, case law is clear that juror testimony may not be used to 
impeach or question the verdict or to show a misunderstanding of law or 
fact or the charge of the court. State v. Gee, 498 P. 2d 662, 665-66 
(Utah 1972) . The Utah Supreme Court has held that in general jurors must 
agree only to the crime charged, not a particular theory of the crime. 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987). In Tillman, the Court noted 
chat there are two classes or criminal statutes: fa) where uhere is one" 
crime with various means to commit the crime, and (b) where the statute 
sets forth several acts, and commission of each is a separate crime. 
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When the statute is (a) above (like the one at issue here) , the jury need 
only come to consensus about the crime itself, not the elements of the 
crime. Id. In State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1987) the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that: 
Many jurisdictions have considered the scope of the 
constitutional requirement of a unanimous jury verdict in 
criminal cases. The decisions are virtually unanimous that a 
defendant is not entitled to a unanimous verdict on the 
precise manner in which the crime was committed, or by which 
of several alternative methods or modes, or under which 
interpretation of the evidence so long as there is substantial 
evidence to support each of the methods, modes, or manners 
charged. 
Thus, if the statute under which the defendant is convicted defines one 
crime which may be committed several different ways, the defendant is not 
entitled to jury unanimity on the way in which the crime was committed. 
State v. Russell, Id. at 166. 
Such is the case here. Clearly there was sufficient evidence that 
the jury could rely upon to find that Mr. Maese (a) procured individuals 
to engage in prostitution or (b) encouraged individuals to become or 
remain prostitutes or (c) transported a person within the state to engage 
in prostitution or (d) shared in proceeds of prostitution and/or (e) 
owned a prostitution business, as has been previously discussed. 
Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment and for a New Trial 
based on allegations of lae-k of ju-pe-r^ -un^ n-imjrty fails. 
STATE V. MAESE PAGE 20 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(iii) Even if the Jurors7 Statements are Considered, the Jury Requested 
and Received a Clarification as to the Court's Instructions, Curing Any 
Confusion and Preserving Mr. Maese's Right to a Unanimous Verdict 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that juries are presumed to have 
relied on instructions given by the Court. See, State v. Harmon, 956 
P.2d 262 (Utah 1998) . Mr. Maese asserts that after the jury received the 
clarification instruction from the Court "they immediately returned a 
guilty verdict on all four counts of Exploiting Prostitution.'' This, Mr. 
Maese argues, is evidence that the jury "violated [his] constitutional 
right to a unanimous verdict." 
In this case, the statements of three jurors as to the specific acts 
that may have constituted the counts of Exploitation of Prostitution is 
argued to have caused some confusion during the deliberations. However, 
the jury brought those questions to the Court, and the Court responded 
by clarifying the instruction that had previously been given. This 
response was considered and approved by counsel before returned to the 
jury.6 "If a trial judge could not correct errors as they occur, few 
trials would be successfully concluded." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 272. The 
Court in this case offered a corrective instruction. It is presumed 
under Utah law that it is that clarifying instruction which the jury 
6While Mr. Maese's counsel acknowledges that he reviewed the answer to the jury 
question, he does not acknowledge that he "approved" it. There is no record however to suggest 
that Mr. Maese's counsel objected to the answer or proposed an alternative instruction. 
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followed in rendering their verdict, not some suggestion of personal 
confusion related by a juror that preceded this instruction. 
3. Mr. Maese Fails to Demonstrate that the Lack of a Ruling on a Bill 
of Particulars Prejudiced Him 
Before the Court discusses the argument, a procedural history of 
this case bears some discussion. The Information in this case was 
originally filed October 4, 2006, and Amended on October 5, 2006. The 
Amended Information contained a Probable Cause Statement which detailed 
over the course of three pages the allegations supporting the criminal 
counts brought against Mr. Maese. 
After preliminary proceedings the Court set a jury trial for January 
9-11, 2008, with a pretrial on December 17, 2007. Mr. Maese was 
represented at these proceedings by an attorney different than the 
attorney who eventually handled his trial in July of 2008. On January 
7, 2008, approximately ten days before the beginning of the scheduled 
jury trial, the parties stipulated to a cancellation of the jury trial 
and the trial was reset for February 20 and 21, with a pretrial on 
February 11, 2008. On February 11, 2008, at the pretrial, nine days 
before the second time this matter was scheduled for trial, Mr. Maese 
moved, through his counsel, to continue the trial, which Motion was 
granted. The trial was reset for a third time on April 2J, 2XJXTS~, wiuh 
a pretrial on April 14, 2008. At the pretrial on April 14, 2008, Mr. 
Maese's counsel indicated that he was prepared to go to trial on April 
STATE V. MAESE PAGE 22 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
23, 2008. However, on the first day of trial, April 23, 2008, Mr. Maese 
asked to discharge his lawyer, at which point the Court granted his 
counsel's Motion to Withdraw and assessed Mr. Maese costs for the 35 
jurors and seven witnesses who were prepared to appear on that day. 
Thereafter, Mr. Athay, Mr. Maese's new trial counsel, made his record of 
appearance and the matter was thereafter set for its fourth jury trial 
setting on July 10 and 11, 2008, with a pretrial on July 7, 2008. 
Thereafter, Mr. Maese filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, 
which was briefed by the parties and argued at the pretrial conference 
three days before the jury trial was to begin on its fourth setting. At 
this pretrial conference additional argument was heard by the Court on 
a Motion to Disqualify the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
for their prosecution in the matter, which Motion was filed four days 
before the pretrial conference, and seven days before the trial was to 
begin. At the pretrial, after hearing arguments from the parties, the 
Court indicated it would render a written opinion on the pending Motions 
prior to the scheduled trial three days later. On that same day, July 
7, 2008, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order which denied 
the defendant's Motion to Disqualify the District Attorney's Office and 
indicated to the parties that "the trial will proceed as scheduled." 
(Memorandum Decision and Order, July 7, 2000.)—The Court did not includ-e-
in that Memorandum Decision any reference to Mr. Maese's Motion for a 
Bill of Particulars, and on the day of trial, after asking both the State 
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and Mr. Maese if they were ready to proceed with the trial, which both 
affirmed they were, the trial commenced. The Court never issued a 
decision on Mr. Maese7s Motion for a Bill of Particulars. 
Mr. Maese argues that the Court's failure to rule on his Motion for 
a Bill of Particulars caused him prejudice by depriving him of the 
opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. 
(i) Mr. Maese waived his right to a ruling on the Motion for a Bill 
of Particulars. 
Rule 12(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that UA 
motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the 
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later 
determination.7' Rule 12 further provides in subsection (f) that, 
"Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to 
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the 
court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may 
grant relief from such waiver." When the Court asked Mr. Maese on the 
day of trial if they were ready to proceed, and received an affirmative 
response, Mr. Maese effectively waived his right to obtain a ruling on 
his Motion for a Bill of Particulars by failing to object to the trial 
proceeding or to otherwise request the Court to issue its opinion before 
the trial began. Indeed, Mr. Maese should well have known than hi~s 
Motion for a Bill of Particulars had been denied when the trial actually 
began. 
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(ii) Mr. Maese suffered no adverse effect for lack of a Ruling on 
his Motion for a Bill of Particulars. 
a. The Amended Information Provided Adequate Notice of the Charges 
Against Mr. Maese 
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides that an 
accused "shall have the right...to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him...." Utah Code Ann., further provides in § 77-14-
1 that the State provide an accused in writing uAs is known to him the 
place, date and time of the commission of the offense charged." In 
interpreting the obligation of the State, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that one nbe charged with a specific crime, so that he can know the 
particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct...." State v. Burnett, 712 
P.2d 260, 262 (Utah 1985). Mr. Maese's Motion for a Bill of Particulars 
sought the particulars of Counts II through V of the Amended Information, 
the Exploitation of Prostitution charges. 
Mr. Maese's claim that he was prejudiced by not receiving a ruling 
by the Court on his Bill of Particulars is not persuasive. Mr. Maese was 
not deprived of the opportunity to provide an adequate defense. The 
Amended Information provided three pages, and nine separate subparagraphs 
detailing the particulars of the crime charged. It provides in paragraph 
5, the following: 
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(a) an escort with initials N.F. was told by Mr. Maese the 
type of sex acts she should perform with a client during July 
and September, 2005, and further that she was told in response 
to a request for sex by a client to work it out; 
(b) an escort with initials A.F. was encouraged by Mr. Maese 
during October and December 2005 to engage in oral sex without 
a condom and that if she didn't engage in sex acts she would 
not get work; 
(c) an escort with initials H.R. discussed with Maese between 
September, 2005 and February, 2006, what to do if she was 
charged with Prostitution because of her sexual intercourse 
with Doll House clients; 
(d) an escort with initials J.H. paid Mr. Maese the Doll House 
fee after sex with clients; 
(e) an escort with initials D.T. was told by Mr. Maese during 
April and May 2006 in a dispute with a client over a fee for 
sex acts to udrive down the hill and get condoms and go back 
and work something out." 
(f) an escort named T.N. told Mr. Maese during the year 2005 
and 2006 of the specific sex acts she and the other escorts 
performed. 
In addition to the particulars set forth in the Amended Information, 
Mr. Maese had already been through a preliminary hearing in which dates, 
places and times of the alleged illegal conduct had occurred. In 
addition, Mr. Maese, over the almost two years of pendency of this 
litigation, had received the State's discovery, which included statements 
and interviews of the escort witnesses who would be testifying against 
him. 
Before Mr. Maese can prevail on his argument that the lack of a 
Court ruling on his Motion for a Bill of Particulars warrants a new 
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trial, he must show that the failure prejudiced him by depriving him of 
the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 3 0 provides in subsection (a) that "Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of 
a party shall be disregarded." 
For an error to affect the substantial rights of Mr. Maese, he must 
show that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
result would have been more favorable to the defendant. State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987); see also, State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App. 238, 
166 P.3d 626. This has been interpreted as the "erosion of confidence" 
test and requires a two-part analysis: First, did the error impede the 
defendant's ability to prepare for trial? Second, did the error so 
impede his ability to prepare a* defense that the likelihood of a 
different outcome was sufficiently high as to undermine the confidence 
in the verdict? Id. at 920. Neither can be met here. 
Generally, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 3 0 puts the burden on the 
defendant to show prejudicial error. See, State v. Blubauah, 904 P. 2d 
688 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (court denied Motion where the accused made np 
showing that further detail would've made any difference in the trial)/ 
State v. Swapp, 808 P. 2d 241 (Utah 1991) (defendant did not show how his 
defense—wa-s—prejudiced—by—fefee—lack—e-f—knowledge-;—he—made—only—a-
conclusory statement that it was difficult to defend) . However, courts 
have found that the burden should shift to the State when it comes to a 
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Motion for Bill of Particulars. The State must show that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the outcome of the trial 
would have favored the defendant. See, State v. Knight, 734 P. 2d 913 
(Utah 1987); State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 104 (Utah 1998). 
Even if this Court erred in failing to rule on the defendant's 
Motion for a Bill of Particulars, such an error does not warrant a new 
trial because it did not "affect the substantial rights of a party." Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(a). Put differently, because it is clear 
from the record that Mr. Maese was not entitled to a bill of particulars, 
any failure to issue an Order denying such bill of particulars is 
rendered harmless. 
In State v. Ramirez , 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991), a decision 
heavily relied upon by Mr. Maese, the trial court did not explicitly rule 
on a Motion to Suppress which it had taken under advisement. In that 
case, however, the failure to issue a ruling on the Motion was harmful 
error because during the suppression hearing, there were numerous factual 
discrepancies among the testimony of the State's witnesses which were 
never ruled upon, and the appellate court was not able to resolve these 
factual discrepancies on its own upon appeal. .Id. at 787. Because of 
the factual discrepancies and the court's failure to resolve them, it was 
not:—clear whether Ramirez wa^ entitled-to have the evidence against him 
suppressed. Id. at 788. In turn, the court was required to reverse his 
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conviction and order a new trial because this was "harmful error." Id. 
at 789. 
The case before this Court is different. Unlike the hearing on the 
Motion to Suppress in Ramirez, there was no evidentiary hearing to 
consider in this case, and no factual discrepancies to consider. The 
only issue before this Court was whether Mr. Maese had received 
sufficient notice through the Amended Information's probable cause 
statement, and the evidence the State provided to him through discovery 
and a preliminary hearing as to what the charges were against him and the 
underlying evidence to support those charges, a finding the Court could 
make based upon the record. 
The record shows that the Amended Information charging Mr. Maese was 
constitutionally sufficient. In State v. Bernards, 166 P.3d 626 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2007), the court explained that an Information is 
constitutionally sufficient if it fully apprises the defendant of the 
"State's evidence upon which the charge is based." I_d. The court added 
that a *[l]ack of factual specificity" does not make an Information 
constitutionally deficient. Further, specific dates are not necessary 
when a count is part of an ongoing criminal enterprise. Ld. at %% 6, 18. 
The probable cause statement included with the Amended Information and 
tire—evidence the State provides—bo the defendant must be considered a-s-
part of the notice to the defendant. id. at % 17. In Bernards, the 
defendant was charged with five counts of Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a 
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Child for sexually abusing his stepdaughter continuously "between 
September 2000 and January 23, 2008." Id. at ff 2, 4. The probable 
cause statement described the evidence of each count. Id. at % 5. Even 
though two of the counts for which he was convicted provided a range of 
dates-- Muring the first part of 2002" and "December 2002" the court held 
Bernards received sufficient notice because the abuse was part of a 
continuing criminal enterprise, the probable cause statement described 
the evidence for each count, and the State provided him with video and 
cassette tapes of interviews with the victim and transcripts of the 
interviews. Id. at ^ 2, 17-18. 
As happened in Bernards, Mr. Maese received sufficient notice. The 
four counts of Exploiting Prostitution for which Mr. Maese sought a Bill 
of Particulars gives a date range—like the Information in Bernards — of 
July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, and the probable cause statement 
outlines the evidence the State used to charge him--just like the 
probable cause statement in Bernards. 
Moreover, the probable cause statement in this case gave the 
initials of former escorts, the dates during which they worked for Mr. 
Maese, and detailed accounts that as they worked for Mr. Maese they were 
expected to perform sex acts with their clients, and that Mr. Maese 
encGUidCjed them in Lliuse enterprises. The Amended Information was more 
than sufficient to identify the witnesses against him and review the 
evidence occurring during their respective employment with the Doll 
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House. Further, the State provided Mr. Maese with all the evidence it 
intended to use against him m response to discovery, including witness 
statements. Furthermore, Mr. Maese had the benefit of a Preliminary 
Hearing m which those charges had been more fully laid out. 
Mr. Maese received constitutionally sufficient notice through the 
Amended Information, the probable cause statement, and the preliminary 
hearing, and the evidence the State provided to him. Mr. Maese was not 
impeded m his preparation for trial by a lack of specificity as to the 
charges against him, nor would the outcome have been any different. 
Unlike the scenario m Ramirez, there is no risk of harm to Mr. Maese 
because that finding is based upon the record. Mr. Maese7s notion that 
a new trial would somehow act as a remedy is faulty reasoning because 
there is no unresolved factual issue to alter the case--only an unstated 
legal ruling which Mr. Maese's counsel himself waived the morning of 
trial, by indicating he was ready to proceed to try the case. 
4. Mr. Maese had Adequate Notice of Pattern of Unlawful Activity 
Mr. Maese argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the 
Amended Information referred to subsections 1, 2 and 3 of the statutory 
provisions for this offense, but not subsection 4, and that the 3ury 
instruction referred to all four subsections,7 thus not permitting Mr. 
7The Amended Information charges Mr Maese with a violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-
10-1603(3), but m its body continued with a recital of subsections 1, 2 and 3. The recital omits 
subsection 4 
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Maese to be prepared to defend against such a charge. Subsection 4 of 
the statute provides that uit is unlawful for any person to conspire to 
violate any provision of Subsection (1), (2) or (3)." 
As previously noted in reference to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
30(a); any variance in the Information "which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." Burnett, 712 P. 2d 
at 2 62. Thus, Mr. Maese must show that the variance prevented him from 
having notice of the charge and hindered his ability to defend against 
the charge. State v. Kiraan, 712 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1985). 
Here the Amended Information makes specific reference to subsections 
(1) , (2) and (3) and, while not making a specific reference to the number 
(4), sets forth the conspiracy nature of the charge. The Amended 
Information alleges that the parties conspired to undertake the illegal 
activities as outlined in subsections 1-3 and further sets forth that 
pursuant to such conspiracy the defendants exploited prostitution. Mr. 
Maese received notice of the charge of conspiracy as part of a Pattern 
of Unlawful Activity and the variance in the charging document did not 
affect a substantial right of Mr. Maese. 
5. The Admission of Testimony Regarding a Sexual Assault was 
Probative and Non-Prejudicial 
Mr. Maese argues that the Court improperly admitted evidence during 
the trial that one of his escorts had been the victim of a sexual assault 
during a specific appointment as a Doll House escort. Mr. Maese argues 
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that the inclusion of such evidence was prejudicial to him as it was not 
relevant, and painted uhim as a party to the rape, after the fact." 
Throughout the trial Mr. Maese's defense theory was that while sexual 
activity may have taken place between his escorts . and Doll House 
clientele, he was wholly unaware of it. Thus, evidence of a conversation 
between Mr. Maese and an escort about sexual activity occurring during 
the course of a Doll House appointment was highly relevant and probative 
on the issue of whether Mr. Maese knew that his escorts were engaging in 
sexual activity on their appointments with Doll House clients, and that 
the fees and tips the Doll House received were from prostitution 
activities. The evidence adduced at trial was that a regular customer 
of the Doll House expected sex during his appointment with an escort, and 
paid for his non-consensual sex with the escort and that the Doll House 
shared in the proceeds. Thus, the evidence was relevant and probative 
and not unfairly prejudicial. Furthermore, the record was replete that 
Mr. Maese did not engage in that act nor condone the non-consensual 
nature of the act and further offered to report the matter to 
authorities. (Testimony of Heather T.) 
Even if the evidence was admitted erroneously, it was harmless. 
Even without the testimony of this particular event, there is no 
reasonable likelihood Lhac—Lhe uuLcotue o£—the case would have been any 
different, given the volume of testimony adduced at trial. This Court 
finds that there was no substantial adverse effect UDon Mr. Maese's 
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rights to warrant a new trial, and no good cause to arrest Judgment. 
Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment and/or Motion for New 
Trial is denied. 
6. The Admission of the Allison J. Letter was Probative and Not Unfairly 
Prejudicial 
Mr. Maese argues that the admission of the letter he drafted to 
Allison J.'s parents accusing her of being a prostitute was irrelevant 
and unfairly prejudicial, and was evidence of other wrongs and therefore 
should require an Arrest of Judgment or New Trial. Again, the Court 
notes that Mr. Maese's defense was grounded upon the premise that he was 
not aware of the prostitution his escorts were engaged m . Thus to now 
argue that the admission of a letter, penned m his own hand, informing 
the parents of one of his former escorts, that their daughter was engaged 
m prostitution while m his employment is not relevant to the issue 
before the Court is specious. It is relevant and not unduly prejudicial. 
Furthermore, the admission of such a letter was not offered as 
evidence of any pertinent trait of character of Mr. Maese, although it 
certainly tells a person about the nature of a person who would do such 
a thing over an employment dispute. The letter was not offered to show 
action m conformity with a cnaracter trait of Mr. Maese, but rather to 
demonstrate Mr. Maese's knowledge that Doll House escorts provided sex 
acts m exchange for money. To this end the letter detailed the conduct 
Allison J. engaged in while an escort of the Doll House and contained 
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reviews from The Erotic Review which included detailed descriptions of 
the sex acts she was willing to engage in for a fee as a Doll House 
escort. The letter further corroborated the testimony of Allison J. and 
other Doll House escorts that Mr. Maese was aware of the revenue Allison 
J. could generate for the Doll House and what exactly she had to do to 
generate that income. Accordingly, the letter's probative value was not 
substantially outweighed by whatever prejudicial effect it may have had 
for Mr. Maese. Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment/New 
Trial is denied as to this issue. 
7. The State Did Not Violate Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure outlines the 
requirements of a prosecutor in disclosing to the defense specified 
evidence obtained in the prosecution of a case. The obligation to 
produce such information is contingent upon request by a defendant and 
is a continuing obligation which requires a prosecutor to disclose newly 
acquired information. State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994). 
The issue Mr. Maese raises here is whether he received complete 
information from the State as a result of testimony elicited either at 
trial or contained in the Amended Information's probable cause statement 
tor which no interview or notes o£ such material was allegedly provided. 
Those areas include: 
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(a) reference in the probable cause statement of the Amended 
Information attributed to Nicole F. that said uB*tch, you are 
gonna have to make it work"; 
(b) reference to trial testimony from Ms. Curtis that an escort 
named Tatiana told Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis about explicit sex 
acts and another incident wherein Mr. Maese attended a 
bachelor party where Doll House escorts provided sex acts to 
the celebrants. 
The State responded by alleging that it supplied all material it had 
related to statements it received from Nicole F. and that while a summary 
of an interview of Nicole F. in the probable cause statement prepared by 
Detective Dan Bartlett ("Detective Bartlett") does not contain the 
statement alleged to have been made by Nicole F., that statement "or one 
substantially similar" is in the video recording of Nicole F.'s interview 
with Detective Bartlett, and that that video recorded interview was 
provided to Mr. Maese7s counsel before trial. Accordingly, the Court 
finds no merit in Mr. Maese's argument that the State withheld 
information from him on this issue. 
As to Ms. Curtis' statements, the State points to specific date-
stamped documents that make specific mention of bachelor parties 
conducted by Doll House escorts. The Sl&ce luiLhei notes—that—che mere 
fact that a witness may testify at trial to something does not suggest 
that the State knew of such testimony before trial and failed to disclose 
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it. It is not uncommon for witnesses to provide statements at trial 
never made in interviews with counsel before trial. The State represents 
it never interviewed an escort of the Doll House named Tatiana, nor did 
they interview Ms. Curtis about Tatiana. Accordingly, the Court finds 
no merit in Mr. Maese's argument on this point. 
Mr. Maese fails to provide a basis for this Court to conclude that 
the State withheld any information in violation of Rule 16. 
8. The State Did Not Engage in Prosecutorial Misconduct by Drawing 
Reasonable Inferences From the Evidence and Questioning Mr. Maese7s 
Credibility 
Mr. Maese argues that the prosecutor in this case engaged in 
misconduct in his closing argument by arguing that Heather T. transferred 
money to Mr. Maese from an incident of non-consensual sex and that Mr. 
Maese's testimony in the area of "compliance" meetings with Doll House 
escorts was not credible. 
(a) Reasonable Inference 
A prosecutor may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence 
adduced at trial and argue them to the jury. State v. Bakalov, 979 P. 2d 
799 (Utah 1999) . The State noted in its argument that Heather T. never 
actually said that she paid Mr. Maese the agency fee for the incident, 
but that it is a reasonable inference which can be drawn from the 
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evidence.8 Several witnesses, including Heather T., testified that Mr. 
Maese and Ms. Curtis routinely received $95 for every appointment a Doll 
House escort handled and typically a tip on top of that. Heather T. 
testified that after she was sexually assaulted, she received $300 or 
$400 as a tip, and also collected an agency fee. She testified that she 
returned back to the Doll House immediately after the assault. It was 
reasonable to infer from this testimony that she paid a Doll House fee 
for the appointment. Further, Heather T. testified that "when we would 
return from the appointment we would go and meet back up with Tiffany and 
Steve, we would give them the agency fee which was at least $100, . . .and 
then the tip we would give to Tiffany because she is the phone person." 
(See T2 at 166.) Therefore, it was a reasonable inference that could be 
drawn from the testimony, and argued to the jury. The Court finds no 
merit in Mr. Maese's argument on this point, nor that it either had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of Mr. Maese or that good 
cause exists to arrest the Judgment or grant a new trial. 
(b) Credibility of Mr. Maese 
As to testimony a defendant may provide at trial, a prosecutor is 
free to comment on credibility. "When a defendant has testified during 
trial, it is proper during a closing argument to comment on defendant's 
The State further asserts that Heather T. had so testified at the earlier preliminary hearing 
and that the official transcript of the trial is inaudible in parts at this point in the testimony as a 
result of the emotional state of the witness. (State Memo in Opposition, p. 29.) 
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credibility and appearance." State v. Jimenez, 21 P. 3d 1142 at 1145 
(Utah Ct. App 2001) . See also, State v. Larsen, 2005 Utah App 201, ^ 14, 
113 P.3d 998; State v. Parsons , 781 P.2d 1275, 1283-84 (Utah 1989); 
United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 436 (5 th Cir. 2001) (A 
prosecutor may assert a witness is not credible if he supports his 
assertion with admitted evidence.) 
Here, the testimony Mr. Maese provided about regular "compliance" 
meetings was contradicted by Mr. M^ese's own witnesses, who testified 
that only two meetings were held. (State Memo in Opp. p. 25.) Indeed, 
the testimony from Ms. Curtis corroborated the fact that compliance 
meetings, while initially held on a regular basis, were disbanded 
altogether because of concerns about scaring the escorts from engaging 
in sex acts. (Tr. Tl 72-80) Clearly, there was a discrepancy between 
Mr. Maese's testimony and the evidence presented by other witnesses, for 
which the credibility of the testimony could be challenged. 
Accordingly, Mr. Maese7 s Motion to Arrest Judgment and/or Motion for 
new Trial is denied. 
Sentencing of Mr. Maese is set for December 22, 2008, at noon. 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE, 
DOB 12/06/76 
AkaNONE 
602-32-2315 
2650 E. 3300 S. #5 
Defendant. 
TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, 
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Screened by: C. Piatt 
Assigned to: C. Piatt 
BAIL: PTS 
Warrant/Release: Summons / Surrender 
DAO# 6018158 
AMENDED 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 061906590 
The undersigned, Detective D. Bartlett - Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, Agency Case 
No 2006-28791, under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the 
crimes of: 
COUNT I 
PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, a Second Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in 
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as 
parties to the offense, attempted, conspired, solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
intentionally aided another to participate as a principal in a pattern of unlawful activity intending 
to receive directly or indirectly, proceeds derived from that pattern of unlawful activity to be 
invested in the acquisition of an interest in the establishment or operation of an enterprise 
contrary to Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, or 
did acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, an interest in or control of an enterprise through a 
pattern of unlawful activity contrary to Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(2), Utah Code 
T
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Annotated, 1953 as amended, or did become persons employed by or associated with an 
enterprise intending to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly in the functions of the 
enterprise through a pattern of unlawful activity contrary to Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 
1603(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and committed an act or acts in the pursuance 
of such attempt or conspiracy; to-wit: between the dates of July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, 
the defendants did exploit prostitution in at least three separate episodes which are not isolated, 
but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victim, or methods of commission, as 
indicated in Counts TWO through FIVE of this Information. 
NOTICE is given that the defendants' STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY 
FRENCH CURTIS, interest in any property or proceeds from the conduct prohibited in Count I 
is subject to forfeiture pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(5), 
1953 as amended. NOTICE is further given pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-10-1603.5 that the district 
attorney seeks the costs of investigating and prosecuting the offense described in Count I, to be 
paid by defendant, in lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by law, and that the defendant be fined 
not more than twice the amount of the net proceeds derived from the conduct engaged in and 
prohibited by Section 76-10-1603. 
COUNT II 
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in 
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as 
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in 
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate 
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or 
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or 
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a 
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent 
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding 
that she was to share therein. 
COUNT III 
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in 
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as 
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in 
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate 
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or 
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or 
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a 
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent 
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding 
that she was to share therein. 
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COUNT IV 
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in 
and around Salt Lake County. State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as 
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in 
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate 
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or 
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or 
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a 
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent 
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding 
that she was to share therein. 
COUNT V 
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in 
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as 
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in 
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate 
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or 
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or 
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a 
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent 
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding 
that she was to share therein. 
COUNT VI 
MONEY LAUNDERING, a Second Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in and around 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1903, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as party to 
the offense, did transport, receive, or acquired property which was in fact proceeds of unlawful 
activity, to wit: Exploitation of a Prostitute, knowing that the property involved represented the 
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, or made proceeds of unlawful activity available to 
another by transaction or transportation, or other means, knowing that it was intended to be used 
for the purpose of continuing or furthering the commission of specified unlawful activity. 
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Detective D. Bartlett; Sgt. Paul Brenneman; witnesses N.F., A.F., H.T., H.R., J.H., D.T., 
T.N., H.W., M.H. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this information on the following: 
1. D House LLC, aka "Doll House" is a registered sexually oriented business 
("SOB") in Summit County, Park City. Doll House is not a registered SOB in any city within 
Salt Lake County. The regiiered owners of D House LLC are TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS 
("CURTIS") and STEVEN SANTIAGO MEESE ("MEESE"). 
2. In March of 2006, the Cottonwood Heights Precinct of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs Office received complaints that the residence located at 7567 South 2160 East, in Salt 
Lake County, was operating as an SOB, specifically, as the escort agency, Doll House. 
3. In March and April, 2006, Detective Dan Bartlett ("Bartlett") conducted trash-
covers at 7567 S. 2160 East. In both instances Bartlett discovered discarded customer names, 
addresses, and escort names on company letterhead, along with appointment dates and meeting 
times, consistent with an SOB being operated without an SOB license. 
4. In an investigation based upon names obtained from the trash covers, as well as 
the Doll House Web Site which contained a link to "theeroticreview.com" ("TER") - a website 
that gives reviews of escorts, written by patrons. Bartlett discovered hundreds of reviews on TER 
which describe specific sexual acts Doll House escorts have performed. 
5. Detective Bartlett conducted numerous interviews with current and past "escort" 
employees of the Doll House. Each interviewee describes an ongoing pattern by which MEESE 
and CURTIS aided and encouraged prostitution, and received the proceeds from the 
appointments. A non-exhaustive description of MEESE and CURTIS' activities as related by 
escorts follows: 
a. N.F., who worked as a Doll House escort between July and September of 
2005 stated taht MEESE would tell her when a customer was a "reg" (a regular) and would 
explain what likes the "reg" had, such as oral sex. N.F. describes one particular instance where 
MEESE ordered her to an appointment where the customer wanted sex. N.F. tried not to have 
sex, and the customer called MEESE to complain. MEESE then called N.F. and told her "B*tch, 
you're gonna have to make it work." N.F. states when she attempted to leave Doll House, 
MEESE threatened her. N.F. states she was not given many appointments because she would not 
have sex with clients. 
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b. A.F., who worked as a Doll House escort between October and December 
of 2005, states that MEESE threatened her if she did not continue working for Doll House. A.F. 
states CURTIS regularly encouraged good reviews on TER, and specifically encouraged bbbj, 
which is a term for oral sex without a condom. A.F. states that CURTIS made clear that if she 
did not tip the phone girl, which was usually her self (the person that sets appointments), she 
would not get any more appointments. 
c. H. r.„ who worked as a Doll House escort between January and March of 
2006, states she did have sex with clients for money, and that she always paid CURTIS out at the 
cottonwood address following the appointments. H.T. states for the first four appointments, the 
entire $145.00 agency fee went to Doll House, plus 20% of any tips. H.T. states that not all 
customers received intercourse - approximately 1 in 8, but that manual sex was frequent and 
easy, approximately 7 in 8. 
d. H.R., who worked as a Doll House escort between September 2005 and 
February 2006, states that she did have intercourse with clients for money, but usually provided 
manual or oral sex because it was easy. H.R. states that MEESE and CURTIS told her that if she 
ever got arrested for prostitution, to not say anything, and they would provide a lawyer for her. 
e. J.H., who worked as a Doll House escort between November and 
December of 2005, states that MEESE told her they would pay for a lawyer if she would not talk 
to police. J.H. states that money was paid out to CURTIS and/or MEESE at the Cottonwood 
address every time. J.H. states that CURTIS told her that clients would ask for sex every time. 
J.H. states that she did have sex with men for money, and would pay CURTIS 20% of the tips. 
J.H. describes as an example one occasion being paid $1,000 for an appointment where she had 
sex, paying out $100 for the "agency fee" and then an additional $200 to CURTIS as a tip. 
f. D.T., who worked as a Doll House escort between April and May of 2006, 
states that she was sent on 3 to 4 dates per day in the beginning. D.T. states that she would have 
sex for money while working for the Doll House. D.T. describes on one particular occasion 
being asked by a customer to have sexual intercourse for $200.00 without a condom. When D.T. 
refused, the customer called MEESE to complain. MEESE then got on the phone and told D.T. 
to drive down the hill and get condoms and go back and ''work something out." 
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g. T.N., who worked as a Doll House escort for approximately one year 
between 2005 and 2006, states that in practice the girls frequently told CURTIS and MEESE of 
the specific sex acts they perform, and that they are required to tip 20% of the "tip" received by 
customers to the call girl that sets the appointment, which was normally CURTIS. T.N. states 
that CURTIS frequently called her and asked her to go to an appointment because the particular 
customer wanted a specific sexual act which other girls are rptwilling to perform. 
Affiant 
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